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There is an increasing interest in computational reactor safety analysis to systematically 
replace the conservative calculations by best estimate calculations augmented by 
quantitative uncertainty analysis methods. This has been necessitated by recent regulatory 
requirements that have permitted the use of such methods in reactor safety analysis. 
Stochastic uncertainty quantification methods have shown great promise, as they are better 
suited to capture the complexities in real engineering problems. This study proposes a 
framework for performing uncertainty quantification based on the stochastic approach, 
which can be applied to enhance safety analysis. 
Additionally, risk level has increased with the degradation of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
equipment and instrumentation. In order to achieve NPP safety, it is important to 
continuously evaluate risk for all potential hazards and fault propagation scenarios and map 
protection layers to fault / failure / hazard propagation scenarios to be able to evaluate and 
verify safety level during NPP operation. In this study, the Fault Semantic Network (FSN) 
methodology is proposed. This involved the development of static and dynamic fault 
semantic network (FSN) to model possible fault propagation scenarios and the 
interrelationships among associated process variables. The proposed method was 
demonstrated by its application to two selected case studies. The use of FSN is essential 
for fault detection, understanding fault propagation scenarios and to aid in the prevention 
of catastrophic events.  
Two transient scenarios were simulated with a best estimate thermal hydraulic code, 





using the OPENCOSSAN software which is based on the Monte Carlo method. The effect 
of uncertainty in input parameters were investigated by analyzing the probability 
distribution of output parameters. The first four moments (mean, variance, skewness and 
kurtosis) of the output parameters were computed and analyzed. The uncertainty in output 
pressure was 0.61% and 0.57% was found for the mass flow rate in the Edward’s blowdown 
transient. An uncertainty of 0.087% was obtained for output pressure and 0.048% for fuel 
pin temperature in the RD-14 test case. These results are expected to be useful for providing 
insight into safety margins related to safety analysis and verification. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Review 
In this chapter, a brief background of the study is given and the problem statement is 
outlined and explained. The research objectives are also stated in this chapter. A fault is 
defined in the background and a description of the safety verification process is given. The 
chapter also identifies certain safety systems and their functions. 
1.2 Background 
 
In Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), safety systems are represented in the form of independent 
layers of protections or barriers. These layers are expected to prevent or reduce the effects 
of all possible hazard scenarios. Typical safety systems are represented within process 
control systems such as alarms, process limits or control rules, which are translated into 
control actions [4]. An effective safety control design can improve plant operation 
economics, by optimizing safety margins to reduce unnecessary shutdown cases [19]. This 
also takes into account human factors involved in plant operation in order to ensure that 
safety margins are matched with required operator actions [17, 15]. 
Faults are abnormal conditions where deterioration occurs to plant equipment/process that 
can be caused by various factors including human errors, environmental stresses or material 
deficiencies [7]. Fault diagnosis and safety verification are important for the operation of 
nuclear power plants for their safe and cost effective operation. Both model based and data 





These methods include Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Neuro fuzzy, signed directed 
graph and fault-tree analysis. Mostly, fault diagnostic approaches are based on the sensors 
that measure important process variables.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
The conservative approach for performing safety analysis may be unrealistic due to limited 
knowledge of uncertainties associated with estimations of parameters important to safety 
by codes. Safety limits based on this approach may be overly conservative. Furthermore, 
it has been identified that there exist discrepancies between the results of codes that have 
been designed to simulate faults and transients in NPPs, such as CATHENA on the one 
hand, and then real time data available from the plants’ operation as well as the results 
obtained from plant simulators. An example of steam generator level in CANDU is shown 
in table 1.1 to demonstrate that the difference between two states is within the error between 
real time and simulation results thereby implying that the transition between two plant 
states might not be captured by a particular method correctly. 
Table 1.1. Steam Generator (SG) levels of CANDU.  
 Level (meters) Difference 
Full Power 14.31 0.16 
Level High Alarm 14.47  
CATHENA 2.16938  
Real Time 1.98738 0.18 
 
These discrepancies may lead to differences in time taken to reach limits and that poses a 





propagation prediction and the relationship between process variables is also affected. 
Fault propagation is affected in terms of speed and the strength between process variables. 
Currently, faults are detected in a nuclear power plant such as CANDU by the use of alarm 
and annunciation windows on the plant control console and the reading of parameter 
changes from the console by operators. However, these do not give adequate information 
on causes and consequences of faults. 
In seeking more accurate simulation models usually from well-established codes to match 
real time data, some challenges arise that makes this approach an impossible task. These 
challenges include the uncertainties inherent in physical systems which makes modeling 
such systems inaccurate. Furthermore, models are based on some assumptions which make 
them unable to represent the physical systems exactly and finally, the complexity of multi-
physics modeling of physical systems does not make their implementation in real time 
applications feasible. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
In order to achieve the stated goal of uncertainty quantification for safety verification 
applications in NPP, this study was carried out with the following objectives: 
1. Develop FSN (static, steady state, dynamic) for given fault scenarios. 
2. Develop stochastic methods to quantify uncertainty associated with code for 
simulations of faults/transients, and map to FSN. 
3. Develop methods to model interactions between Process Variables (PV) for given 





4. Develop a method for safety verification to link independent protection layers (IPLs) 
with defense-in-depth (DiD) and fault scenarios, and map to FSN. 
Independent protection layers are independent layers of protection implemented to prevent 
fault propagation in a plant. Defense-in-depth is a concept of establishing multiple barriers 
in a process in order to prevent and mitigate faults and their consequences. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The following outlines the organization of this thesis: 
Chapter 1  
In chapter 1, a brief background of the study is given; the problem statement is outlined 
and explained. The research objectives are also stated in this chapter. A fault is defined in 
the background and a description of the safety verification process is given. The chapter 
also identifies some safety systems and their functions. 
Chapter 2 
In chapter 2, a review of existing literature related to this study is presented. Basic concepts 
of fault diagnosis are briefly explained in addition to a review of some fault diagnosis 
methods currently being used. This chapter contains a description of safety instrumented 
systems and safety integrity levels in relation to safety verification. Finally, the chapter 







Chapter 3  
In chapter 3, the proposed methodology of this study is given and explained. The proposed 
framework for performing uncertainty quantification for safety verification applications is 
presented and discussed. A detailed description of the stochastic uncertainty quantification 
method used in this study is also given. 
Chapter 4  
In chapter 4, selected case studies considered for application of the proposed FSN 
methodology are described. The rationale for selecting these cases is explained and fault 
propagation scenarios related to these case studies are defined and described. 
Chapter 5 
In chapter 5, the proposed simulation models used in the study are presented and explained. 
The best estimate thermalhydraulic code, CATHENA is introduced and a sample problem 
described. FSN methodology is also described in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 
In chapter 6, results of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis performed for the RD-14 test 
facility are presented and discussed. Uncertainty quantification results obtained in this 
study compared with similar results in literature using other methods is also presented in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Results of uncertainty quantification performed for the Edward’s pipe blowdown problem 





method applied to the case studies described in chapter 4 as well as a linking of uncertainty 
quantification results with the FSN methodology through rule updating. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions drawn from this study and recommendations to various stakeholders are 
presented in this chapter. The chapter also contains an outline of the innovative 















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Review 
In this chapter, a review of existing literature related to this study is presented. Basic 
concepts of fault diagnosis are briefly explained in addition to a review of some fault 
diagnosis methods currently being used. This chapter contains a description of safety 
instrumented systems and safety integrity levels in relation to safety verification. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with an overview of the uncertainty quantification concept and 
methods. 
2.2 Fault Diagnosis  
Fault detection and diagnosis is essential in maintaining a high level of performance, 
increasing system availability and taking appropriate corrective actions. This can be 
applied in processes such as, spacecraft, aircraft, chemical plants and nuclear power plants 
[30, 32, 33, and 34]. Fault diagnosis usually comprises fault detection and isolation. Fault 
detection involves distinguishing between normal and faulty conditions. Fault isolation 
deals with determining the source of the fault, i.e. which sensor, actuator or component is 
the source of the fault. Hence the abbreviation FDI (fault detection and isolation) is 
normally used in literature. 
 
Several methods have been extensively utilized and reported for fault diagnosis and safety 
verification of complex systems such as nuclear power plants, aircrafts, chemical 
processing plants and space vehicles. These methods include the following: fault tree 





propagation, however FTA is limited because it is implemented manually and not suitable 
for real-time fault diagnosis [18]. Zhao and Upadhyaya [29] and Gross et al. [10] also used 
model based methods for fault diagnosis. The sign directed graph (SDG) is a logic based 
method [14] that can be used to perform fault diagnosis. Although SDG is a useful method 
for fault diagnosis and propagation, its usage is undesirable since it requires robust 
mechanisms to construct fault models [7]. Data-driven solutions based on computational 
intelligent methodology have gained popularity in fault diagnosis of nuclear power plants. 
They include, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Genetic Algorithms (GA), fuzzy logic 
and Neuro fuzzy techniques. These computationally intelligent methods have been widely 
used in recent times due to their learning abilities for fault diagnosis and their inherent 
parallel structures. They have therefore been applied in different types of industries 
including geophysical [23], oil and gas [9] and in nuclear steam supply system of a nuclear 
power plant [12]. The following sections present some basic concepts of model-based FDI 
methods as well as a review of some methods that have been used for fault diagnosis 
reported in literature. 
2.2.1 Basic Concepts of Model-based FDI Methods 
Model-based methods for fault diagnosis have been a major research subject in the past 
few decades [31]. These methods are mainly based on analytical redundancy which entails 
comparison between signals generated by mathematical models of a system and actual 
process measurements. The difference between model values and actual measurements is 
known as residual quantities [35, 30, 36, and 37]. A major advantage of analytical 





without the need for additional hardware resources [38]. Model-based FDI require only 
input-output data and consists of two stages; residual generation and residual evaluation 
(decision making) as shown in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2. 1 General structure of model-based FDI [33] 
2.2.2 Residual Generation for Fault Diagnosis 
A system with possible faults is given by [38], 
𝑦(𝑠) = 𝐺𝑢(𝑠)𝑢(𝑠) + 𝐺𝑓(𝑠)𝑓(𝑠)                                                                                               (2.1) 
Where  𝐺𝑢(𝑠) and 𝐺𝑓(𝑠) are input and fault transfer matrices respectively, u, y are system 
input and output vectors respectively. 𝑓 = [𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑞]
𝑇is a fault vector, with each 
element representing a particular fault. The fault vector is usually considered as an 
unknown time function. Residuals generated for FDI must satisfy the following condition; 
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𝑟(𝑡) ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓(𝑡) ≠ 0                                                                                                        (2.2) 
The general structure for residual generation is expressed mathematically as [33], 
𝑟(𝑠) = 𝐻𝑢(𝑠)𝑢(𝑠) + 𝐻𝑦(𝑠)𝑦(𝑠)                                                                                       (2.3) 
Where 𝐻𝑢(𝑠) and 𝐻𝑦(𝑠) are transfer matrices that can be obtained using stable linear 
systems. In a system without a fault, 𝐻𝑢(𝑠) and 𝐻𝑦(𝑠) must satisfy the condition, 
𝐻𝑢(𝑠) + 𝐻𝑦(𝑠)𝐺𝑢(𝑠)=0                                                                                              (2.4) 
The parameterizations of 𝐻𝑢(𝑠) and 𝐻𝑦(𝑠) is dependent on the choice of the residual 
generation method. A suitable selection of 𝐻𝑢(𝑠) and 𝐻𝑦(𝑠) can result in the desired 
performance of the residual. 
2.2.3 Review of Model-based Residual Generation Methods  
2.2.3.1 Observer-based Methods 
These methods involve the estimation of the system output based on inputs and outputs of 
the monitored system by an observer. The (weighted) difference between the estimated and 
the actual outputs is the residual [39, 30, 40, 33 and 37]. The Main advantages of this 
approach include: 1) fast reaction to incipient faults, 2) suitable for fault detection and 
isolation in sensors and actuators, 3) the design procedure is systematic and simple and 4) 
it is easy to implement and execute the algorithm. Some disadvantages include: 1) 
difficulties may arise when applying linear observers to highly nonlinear systems [39, 30, 





classes of nonlinearities, 3) requires a fairly accurate system model for a priori modelling. 
This approach is also not fully verified [40, 41]. 
2.2.3.2 Parity Relation Methods 
This method entails checking inconsistencies between inputs and outputs of the monitored 
system. The mismatched term is used as the residual signal [42, 43, 44 and 45]. The method 
has been shown to be similar to the use of a dead-beat observer [33]. Observer-based 
methods are similar to parity relation methods with a few differences such as; 1) use of 
directional residual which may be difficult, 2) the method can be applied to only linearized 
models, and 3) advanced techniques such as optimally robust parity relations may be used 
to ensure robustness of the fault diagnosis system. Both observer-based and parity relation 
methods can be designed in the frequency as well as time domains. In the frequency 
domain, advantages such as the use of frequency distribution of faults, noise and modelling 
uncertainty can be used to achieve a robust fault diagnosis system [38]. 
2.2.3.3 Parameter Estimation Methods 
The method involves the online estimation of model parameters and the residual is based 
on a comparison between estimated and actual parameter values. The error between the 
actual and predicted output can be considered as the residual signal [46, 47, 48 and 40]. 
Some advantages of the parameter estimation methods are: 1) detection and isolation of 
faults in sensors and actuators is quite straight forward, 2) noise is easily handled in this 
method, and 3) can have a good self-learning capability if the estimation method is 





parameters do not correspond to model parameters and make the design of the directional 
residual impossible [46, 47, 48 and 40], 2) the detection and isolation of faults in sensors 
and actuators is complicated. And 3) the method requires a large amount of computations 
during implementation. 
2.2.3.4 Neural Network Methods 
This method is similar to observer-based methods with the observer replaced by a neural 
network. The neural network estimates the system output and the residual is the difference 
between the estimated and the actual outputs [49]. The following are some advantages of 
this method: 1) convenient for detecting faults in sensors and actuators, 2) has good ability 
to detect and isolate parameter faults, 3) detection of multiple faults is possible, 4) excellent 
in fault detection in nonlinear systems. Some disadvantages include: 1) requires a large 
amount of computation during implementation, 2) Neural networks need to be trained 
extensively during the design stage. This method forms part of the FDI framework 
proposed in this study because of its capabilities in performing accurate fault diagnosis by 
learning the system as has been demonstrated in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
2.2.4 Residual Evaluation (Decision Making) 
It is important for a FDI system to be robust, which is avoiding errors in fault diagnosis 
resulting in false alarms due to parameter uncertainty, disturbances and noise. Robustness 
can be enhanced at the residual evaluation stage of FDI [50, 51]. Residual evaluation can 
be carried out by threshold logic, fuzzy logic or neural networks. These methods are briefly 





2.2.4.1 Threshold Logic 
This method involves the comparison between a residual evaluation function, 𝐷𝐹(𝑟(𝑡)) 
and a defined threshold, 𝑇(𝑡) in a test shown below [52, 53, and 54].  
𝐷𝐹(𝑟(𝑡)) {
≤ 𝑇(𝑡)     𝑛𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
> 𝑇(𝑡)  𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
   
A positive test result is indication of a likely fault while 𝐷𝐹(𝑟(𝑡)) ≤ 𝑇(𝑡) indicates a no 
fault system. The determination of a residual evaluation function and the threshold are the 
main tasks to be performed. 
2.2.4.2 Residual Evaluation Function 
The norm of the instantaneous residual value can be used as an evaluation function if the 
residual is robust and the noise is small. In stochastic systems, statistical testing theory is 
used to determine residual functions and thresholds [54]. Chi-squared testing, generalized 
likelihood ratio testing (GLRT) are some methods that have been utilized in residual 
evaluation [55, 37]. 
2.2.4.3 Threshold Determination 
Thresholds are positive fixed values determined either by experience or by experiments. 
Fixed thresholds, optimal thresholds from Markov theory or adaptive thresholds [56, 57 
and 58] are some of the methods used for threshold determination. The adaptive thresholds 
that involve the variation of the thresholds according to the control activity of the process 





2.2.5 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is used in residual evaluation to make decisions which produce weighted 
alarms instead of Boolean decisions. The fuzzy inference system aids the plant operator in 
taking the final decision [59, 60]. Fuzzy logic translates analytical information and expert 
knowledge into a rule-based knowledgebase with the capability to make intelligent 
decisions even when information is uncertain. The introduction of fuzzy logic into residual 
evaluation provides a reliable decision making tool which can be applied in real industrial 
systems. 
2.2.6 Neural Networks for Residual Evaluation 
Neural networks learn and store information from residual history. They can distinguish 
noise, thereby providing a stable, automated and highly sensitive diagnostic tool. In pattern 
recognition, an input feature vector is mapped unto various decision classes. The decision 
classes correspond to various faults that might exist in a particular system. A neural 
network can be used as a pattern recognizer to partition residual patterns and activate alarm 
signals [61, 62]. Fault patterns can be stored in neural networks during training and can be 
used to detect and isolate specific faults. Neural networks are therefore suitable for feature 
extraction and recognition of complex features in residuals to aid in FDI. 
The structured identification of faults, causes and consequences is still a major problem in 






2.2.7 Optimum Sensor Placement 
Sensor placement plays an important role in an FDI system. Process variables are affected 
by the onset and propagation of a fault. The main objective of the FDI system is to identify 
these faults and also to determine the root cause of the fault identified. The efficiency of 
the FDI system is thus dependent on the ability of the sensor network to detect failure 
modes and abnormal conditions. With several process variables in a NPP that need to be 
measured, the selection of optimum sensor locations presents a unique problem. The 
solution to the sensor placement problem can be summarized as: 
1) Generating a set of process variables that are affected by the onset of a fault by 
means of fault modeling. 
2) Use of the generated set to identify sensor locations based on the design criteria of 
the plant. The cause-effect information is represented in a fault-sensor maximum 
connectivity matrix. 
2.2.8 Fault Observability and Resolution 
This refers to the condition that every fault defined for the process has to be observed by 
at least one sensor. For a given process, the observability problem becomes finding the 
minimum number of sensors that would cover all faults (root nodes). This is commonly 
known as minimum set covering problem [25]. Resolution refers to the ability to identify 
the exact fault that has occurred. The fault observability and resolution could be solved by 
linking the root nodes and sensor locations, but this becomes difficult due to increasing 
number of faults and sensor locations. Heuristics often give a quick and reasonably 





multiple fault observability and resolution problem as reported in [21, 2]. Not all faults are 
distinguishable by using the sensor placement sets obtained from the above method. 
However, these methods provide essential information to the PCA-based FDI system. 
2.3 Safety Analysis and Verification 
2.3.1 Safety Instrumented System (SIS)  
SIS include sensors, logic solvers and final elements that ensure that a plant operates under 
safe conditions within defined limits and free from hazards. In a NPP such as the CANDU, 
the shutdown system number one (SDS#1) which consists of 32 control rods made of 
cadmium and stainless steel is an example of a SIS. The system does not take part in the 
plant normal operation but is poised and on standby to be deployed when necessary to 
restore the plant to a safe operating mode. 
2.3.2 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
It is defined as the likelihood of a SIS to satisfactorily perform the required safety functions 
under all stated conditions, within a stated period of time (IEC 61508). SIL is a discrete 
level (from 1 to 4) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of safety functions. The 
design of an SIS determines the overall SIL. It is a target probability of the system average 
probability of failure on demand (PFDavg). Table 2.1 shows the safety integrity levels and 







Table 2.1. SIL for a low demand operation [93]. 
SIL PFDavg 
1 10-1- 10-2 
2 10-2- 10-3 
3 10-3- 10-4 
4 10-4- 10-5 
 
2.3.2 Fault Tolerance 
This is the ability of a system to prevent a fault from progressing into system failures and 
is achieved by incorporating some redundancy (using multiple instruments to serve the 
same purpose) into the system design.  
2.3.3 Failure Modes 
SIS failure modes are described as either safe or dangerous. Failures that do not pose any 
threats to the safety of the system are described as safe while those that have a potential to 
compromise system safety are described as dangerous failures. Both safe and dangerous 
failures may either be detected or undetected by the fault diagnosis system. It is generally 
more acceptable to detect safe failure modes including false alarms than not to detect 
dangerous failure modes. Equations 2.5-2.7 illustrate this concept based on the standard in 
[93]. 
T D S             (2.5) 
Where,  





D  is the dangerous failure mode. 
S  is the safe failure mode. 
(1 ) (1 )T D D D D S S S S                   (2.6) 
Where, 
S  is the diagnostic coverage for safe failures. 
D  is the diagnostic coverage for dangerous failures. 
T DD DU SD SU               (2.7) 
Where, 
,DD DU  is the dangerous detected and dangerous undetected failure rates, respectively. 
,SD SU   is the safe detected and safe undetected failure rates, respectively. 
2.3.4 Common Cause Failure 
This is the failure of more than one item as a result of the same stress or cause. Certain 
complexities are encountered in dealing with this category of failures due to the difficulty 





2.3.5 Protection Layers and Defense-in-depth 
In NPPs, safety is achieved by the implementation of various barriers that are meant to 
ensure that processes are carried out in a safe and reliable manner and also to prevent and 
control any abnormal/accident conditions that may occur as well as to mitigate any 
consequences of accidents if they occur. This is the defense-in-depth concept. Safety 
protection layers are mapped to defense-in-depth levels in which each defense-in-depth 
level should be covered by more than one protection layer. Independent protection layers 
(IPLs) include: IPL1: safety design; IPL2: basic process control/alarm; IPL3: critical alarm; 
IPL4: safety instrumented system (SIS); IPL5: relief devices; IPL6: physical protection; 
IPL7: site emergency procedures; and IPL8: community protection. Table 3.1 shows the 
defense-in-depth levels. 
 
Table 3.1. Defense-in-depth levels 
Level             Description 
Level 1          Prevention of abnormal operation and malfunctions 
 
Level 2          Control of abnormal operation and detection of malfunctions 
 
Level 3          Control of accidents included in the design basis. 
 
Level 4          Control of severe accident conditions of the plant, including the prevention  
                       of accident progression and mitigation of consequences. 
 
Level 5        Mitigation of environmental/radiological consequences of significant   






2.3.6 CANDU Shutdown Systems 
CANDU has two shutdown systems called shutdown system number one (SDS#1) and 
shutdown system number two (SDS#2). SDS#1 is made up of solid neutron absorbing rods 
that are dropped into the reactor core while a liquid poison (Gadolinium nitrate) is 
introduced into the moderator for SDS#2. They are functionally and physically 
independent of each other and are able to shut down the reactor separately. The two 
shutdown systems respond automatically to neutronic and process signals and their 
independence is achieved by using diversity in areas such as types of instruments used, 
source of electric and pneumatic power and the software languages used. The shutdown 
systems are activated by trip parameters that include; high neutron power, high rate of 
neutron power, low coolant flow, high coolant pressure, low pressurizer level, low steam 


















2.3.7 Safety Verification 
Verification is the evaluation of an implementation to determine that applicable safety-
critical requirements for any plant and its operations as specified are satisfied. The 
verification process ensures that the design solution meets all validated safety 
requirements. [22]. A verified system shows measurable evidence that it complies with the 
overall system safety needs by incorporating an integrated framework. 
2.3.8 Current Safety Assessment and Verification Practices for NPPs 
Safety assessments are undertaken for NPPs to evaluate the compliance with safety 
requirements. According to the IAEA standard for Safety Assessment for Facilities and 
Activities [63], an independent verification of the safety assessment must be carried out 
prior to its use by the operating Organization (such as Bruce Power or OPG) or before it is 
submitted to the regulatory body. The following guidelines are provided by the IAEA 
standard [63] for carrying out independent verification of the safety assessment: 
1. Verification is carried out by qualified experts. The objective of an independent 
verification is to determine whether safety assessment was done in an acceptable way. 
2. The verification is expected to review and determine whether the safety assessment 
carried out was comprehensive. It should also identify any radiation risks that had not been 
taken into account. 
3. The accuracy of models used to represent the design and operation of the plant must 
be determined by the verification. 
4. The regulatory body (CNSC/NRC) is required to carry out an independent 





2.3.9 Requirements for Safety Analysis and Assessment 
Safety assessment according to the CNSC’s REGDOC-2.4.1 [74] involve structured 
processes that enable the verification of applicable safety requirements during the entire 
life cycle phases of NPPs. Areas covered by safety assessment include design adequacy, 
safety analysis, equipment fitness for service and emergency preparedness. 
Safety analysis forms part of safety assessment and it is mainly an analytical quantitative 
study that is performed to demonstrate the safety of a NPP as well as to test the adequacy 
of its design and performance. Safety analysis can be performed either quantitatively 
(deterministic) or probabilistically (PSA). 
The guide [74] outlines requirements for the establishment of a process by operating 
organizations of NPPs to ensure that the safety analysis reflects the following; current 
condition of the plant, current operating limits, experience obtained from operating the 
plant as well as experimental research findings, new modeling and computational 
capabilities to determine likely impacts on the conclusions of safety analysis. It also 
requires the use of human performance estimation in the safety analysis. 
As a result of the above requirement, this study is conducted to explore various 
computational methods that will enhance fault propagation analysis and to perform safety 
verification. 
2.4 Multiphysics Simulations for Safety Analysis in NPPs 
In NPPs, various computational tools are used to perform safety analysis and safety 





scenarios for various systems in a NPP. For example, for thermal hydraulics; RELAP5, 
STAR CCM+ and CATHENA are used. For neutronics; MCNP, DRAGON and WIMS are 
used. The codes mentioned above are used by regulators, operating organizations and 
researchers to perform safety assessment and verification of NPPs. 
2.5 Uncertainty and Safety Analysis 
Uncertainty is a range attached to a measurement or computed parameter within which the 
true value is believed to lie. It is the most widely accepted way of expressing the accuracy 
of results and it covers both systematic and random errors including noise. In safety 
analysis, uncertainty quantification plays a crucial role mainly because knowledge of 
uncertainties associated with estimations of parameters important to safety will ensure that 
safety limits are not violated under any circumstance. Additionally, uncertainty 
quantification helps industry regulators to accept more realistic safety margins rather than 
relying on single value conservative estimates. 
A number of studies on uncertainty quantification applied to safety analysis have been 
reported in literature. The Software for Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis (SUSA) 
developed in Germany was used to perform uncertainty quantification for a large break 
loss of coolant accident on a German pressurized water reference reactor. The results 
showed instances during the transient where the upper limit of the maximum clad 
temperature was not bounded by the conservative calculation of same [65]. In a similar 
study, uncertainty and sensitivity analysis was performed on the TALL-3D facility by 
coupling ANSYS CFX (CFD) and ATHLET codes. The results provided uncertainty 





with experimental data in order to assess agreement between simulations and experimental 
data [90]. In other studies, uncertainty in selected input parameters was estimated using 
RELAP5-3D and VIPRE -01 codes for a small modular reactor. The uncertainty 
quantification results obtained showed that the output parameter range estimates were 
within regulatory accepted limits [91]. 
2.6 Uncertainty Quantification in NPP Simulations 
Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is an important exercise that needs to be conducted as part 
of NPP simulations. This is due to the fact that uncertainties arise from various sources 
during the modeling and simulation process, these sources include; uncertainties in the 
input parameters used, model uncertainties arising from assumptions made in modeling a 
physical system as well as the type of numerical methods used in solving the problem. UQ 
basically asks the question, what range of outputs will be observed given the range of 
uncertain input parameter values? The UQ process therefore involves the determination of 
the range and probability of the outputs or the output probability density function (PDF). 
UQ methods can be broadly classified into the following: a) sampling based methods, b) 
Code Surrogates and c) Ad joint methods. Both sampling based methods and code 
surrogates can be described as computer codes in black box mode. Examples of these 
category include regression analysis and Monte Carlo methods. Code surrogates are 
simplified mathematical models of inputs and outputs, examples include; Unscented 
Transform (UT), Alternating Conditional Expectation (ACE) and Gaussian Process Model 





2.6.1 Uncertainty Propagation 
The process of uncertainty propagation involves the selection of input parameters and 
quantifying the effects of uncertainty in these inputs on selected output parameters. 
Variability in input parameters affects output or response parameters. These effects are 
analyzed in order to estimate uncertainties on the outputs. Input parameter uncertainty 
propagation is executed by the identification of uncertain input parameters, followed by 
the characterization of these inputs using probability distributions and ranges, then 
performing model recalculations with variations of the input. This process can be done 
either deterministically or using probabilistic approaches. 
Uncertainties in the input parameters are propagated through the model to produce an 
output. Performing a number of model recalculations enables an output distribution to be 
obtained. This distribution can then be analyzed to estimate the uncertainty of the output 
due to the input uncertainties [88; 89]. Input parameter uncertainty propagation was 
performed in this study with details given in subsequent chapters.  
2.6.2 Deterministic Uncertainty Quantification Methods 
In deterministic methods, probability distributions are not used to quantify the parameter 
uncertainties. Uncertainty ranges based on available experimental data are specified and 
uncertainty results are deterministic. Sensitivity analysis performed using these methods 
are based usually on local sensitivity values. These are derived from computing the change 
in model output divided by the change in a particular input parameter. Examples of 
deterministic tools developed and used are the Atomic Energy Authority Winfrith (AEAW) 





2.6.3 Stochastic Uncertainty Quantification Methods  
This method consists of: the identification of the NPP, the best estimate code and the 
transient to be analyzed, followed by the identification of uncertain input parameters (initial 
conditions and boundary conditions), then a screening of input parameters to be included 
in the analysis based on a priori knowledge if it exists. Examples of stochastic methods for 
UQ which have been used include, the Code Scaling and Uncertainty (CSAU) method used 
in Canada, the Software for Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis (SUSA) developed in 
Germany, the Institute de protection et de sûreté nucleaire developed in France and the 
Empresa Nacimal del Uranio, SA developed in Spain. 
The use of stochastic methods to perform UQ has gained significant interest in recent times. 
These methods include Bayes and Laplace’s subjective interpretation of probability as a 
state of information and their wide acceptance relative to other methods is due to the well-
developed concept of probability. In the stochastic methods, uncertainties are represented 
mathematically by random variables and by suitable probability distributions. The 
stochastic analysis allows for UQ and its propagation to the outputs, which may be 
mathematically perceived as random variables adequately described by their probability 
distribution. UQ yields certain benefits including assessing the reliability and variability of 
outputs as well as providing useful information that would enhance the design process and 
increase the fidelity of the prediction. Closely related to UQ is sensitivity analysis which 
involves mainly uncovering the quantities responsible for the variability of the outputs. The 
uncertainties that may be due to the lack of knowledge would be reducible by obtaining 
more information on the quantities causing the variability in the output. Irreducible 





compromised [64]. Sensitivity measures such as the Spearman rank correlation is used and 
it provides the variation of the output in terms of standard deviations when the input 
uncertainties vary by one standard deviation [65]. 
2.6.4 Sources of Uncertainty 
Uncertainties associated with the use of best estimate codes to perform safety analysis arise 
from the following sources: 
1. Uncertainties arising from the model or code. 
2. Uncertainties due to the numerical solution method used. 
3. Uncertainties resulting from modelling the nuclear power plant. 
4. Input parameter uncertainties (initial and boundary conditions). 
In this study, the focus has been on uncertainties due to input parameters. A more detailed 
list of sources of uncertainties can be derived from the already mentioned ones and 
summarized below: 
I. The conservation of mass, energy and momentum equations solved are 
approximate. Geometric discontinuities are not considered and not all 
interactions between steam and liquid are accounted for. 
II. Velocity profiles are not considered within a particular geometry. The use of 
cross section averaging at the geometry level is a source of uncertainty. 
III. The use of empirical correlations to close the balance equations is another 






IV. Steady state conditions under which correlations are derived do not exist in NPP 
during transients. 
V. The use of approximate material properties. 
VI. The code user effect is another source of uncertainty. This can arise from the 
process of nodalization, interpreting transient results or interpreting information 
supplied in code user manuals. Differences in these areas with different users 
may give rise to uncertainties. 
Although there are several sources of uncertainty as noted above, the focus of this study is 
input parameter uncertainty propagation through the code. The models implemented in the 
code are assumed to be good enough and the effect of uncertainty in selected input 
parameters is quantified by observing their effect on output parameters. 
The above sources of uncertainties present a formidable challenge to the scientific 
community and active research is ongoing to address these issues in order to enhance code 
prediction accuracy [89]. This study is also expected to contribute to such efforts. 
 
2.6.5 Modeling Uncertainties 
Probability can be used to effectively model uncertainties. In this way, scalar values of 
inputs and outputs can be represented by random variables. The uncertainty modeling 
approach used in the software OpenCOSSAN is described in this section. Details of the 





Various distributions are used to specify a random variable, they include normal, log-
normal and uniform. If experimental data is available, these maybe used to construct the 
set of random variables. A maximum likelihood method is then used to determine 
parameters that result in an optimal fit of the experimental data by a particular distribution. 
The maximum likelihood method is an efficient tool that obtains estimators of the 
distribution parameter having optimal statistical properties [66]. 
An uncorrelated multivariate distribution is obtained by transformation of the multiple 
correlated distribution. This is achieved in the standard normal space which is a multi-
dimensional random variable space with zero mean, a unit standard deviation and Gaussian 
marginal probability density functions. This step is necessitated by the fact that pseudo-
random number generators usually generate independent samples. 
Stochastic processes such as Monte Carlo (MC) and random fields can be applied to model 
parameters which vary randomly and are functionally dependent in a multi-dimensional 
continuous space [67, 68]. If the stochastic process is Gaussian, then it is adequately 
defined by the mean function and the covariance function. The covariance function may 
be considered the mutual influence of the process at two different spatial-coordinates or 
time-instants [64]. The MC method is applied in the OpenCOSSAN software and used in 
this study to model uncertainties of input parameters used to simulate a transient by 
CATHENA. 
2.6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed in order to estimate the effect of uncertain input 





information on areas where designs can be changed in order to improve performance. It 
identifies variables that affect model results the most [16, 24] and can be used for model 
calibration and validation. 
Local sensitivity analysis, screening methods and global sensitivity analysis are the major 
types of sensitivity analysis used. The computationally intensive nature of global 
sensitivity analysis makes the local sensitivity analysis the most utilized method in 
practical applications [31]. In local sensitivity analysis, the response of a model is obtained 
by varying the inputs one-at-a time while holding the other inputs fixed. Global sensitivity 
analysis considers the entire range of variation of input parameters with the aim of 
accounting for the entire output uncertainty according to the different sources of 
uncertainties in the model inputs [16]. 
The first order derivative of an output with respect to an uncertain input parameter gives 








         (2.8) 
Where Y is the output and 𝑋𝑖 is the uncertain input parameter. A more informative form of 
equation 2.8 is obtained by normalizing the derivatives by standard deviations of inputs 











       (2.9) 
A MC method is known to give accurate estimates of the gradient of a function [34]. The 
gradient in this method is obtained by random sampling in the neighborhood of an arbitrary 





obtain accurate estimates of sensitivity indices, the computational time involved for 
complex models is huge. This makes it necessary for model reduction methods to be 

















CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Review 
In chapter 3, the thesis framework is presented and the stochastic uncertainty quantification 
methodology used in the study is introduced and explained.  
3.2 Methodology Framework 
In this study, a methodology is proposed for uncertainty quantification and sensitivity 
analysis for safety verification in NPPs and other applications. The proposed method seeks 
to achieve more accurate transient/fault propagation analysis by estimating the 
uncertainties associated with process variable prediction. To this end, normal and transient 
simulations by a best estimate thermalhydraulic code, CATHENA were utilized. The 
various steps that would achieve the objectives of the study are represented in figure 3.1 
and the various components are described in the subsequent sections. The proposed 








Figure 3.1 Proposed Methodology Framework for performing Uncertainty Quantification 
for safety verification applications 
In figure 3.1, the framework begins with scenario description of faults. This entails a 
detailed definition and description of a fault or transient. Two standard transient scenarios 
which are related to the loss of coolant in the primary heat transport system of a CANDU 
reactor were used in this study. The research then proceeded with the modelling and 
simulation of the fault scenarios from the previous step. Both transients were modelled by 
the Canadian Nuclear Laboratory and the best estimate thermal hydraulic code, 
CATHENA was utilized to simulate these transients. A comparison between the simulated 
results and experimental data was then made in order to quantify the uncertainty associated 
with selected input parameters. In the next step, a sensitivity analysis was performed to 
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determine the contribution of various input parameters to the global uncertainty observed 
in the output parameters. All the preceding steps mentioned were linked with the 
development and maintenance of the fault semantic network (FSN). This was achieved by 
using the uncertainty quantification results to update the fuzzy rule base of the FSN for 
safety verification applications. Other blocks included in the proposed framework but were 
not studied as part of this thesis are; improving code predictions and preparing a safety 
analysis report. These would be considered for future studies. More information on the 
blocks mentioned above have been provided in the following sections. 
3.2.1 Scenario Description of Faults 
Various fault scenarios or transients may occur during the lifetime of NPPs. These 
scenarios are usually simulated by dedicated codes in order to estimate plant response 
should they occur. One important fault associated with the primary heat transport system 
is the loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The thermal hydraulic code, CATHENA was 
developed mainly to simulate LOCA scenarios in CANDU. In this study, two fault 
scenarios were simulated using CATHENA. Transients related to the steam generator and 
the turbine systems were also used to demonstrate the fault semantic network methodology. 
The scenarios considered in this study were selected based on their likelihood of occurrence 
and their importance to performing safety analysis of any NPP. 
3.2.2 Modelling and Simulation of Scenario 
Two transient scenarios were simulated in this study: a small break LOCA in the RD-14 





the CNL and the input files were modified and adapted to suit the objectives of this study. 
Additionally, two case studies were used to demonstrate the proposed FSN methodology: 
faults associated with the steam generator in a nuclear power plant and a turbine trip 
scenario. These faults were created and simulated using the IAEA CANDU 9 simulator. 
Details of the above simulation models and results are presented in subsequent chapters of 
the thesis. 
3.2.3 Compare Simulation and Real time 
Results obtained from executing experiments for certain fault scenarios exist. These results 
can be considered the real time data that is compared with simulation results from codes. 
Uncertainty associated with code simulations is possible without the experimental data. In 
this study, experimental results of the RD-14 test obtained from the CNL were utilized in 
performing uncertainty quantification. 
3.2.4 Stochastic Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Framework 
The uncertainty and sensitivity analysis methodology used in this study is based on the 






Figure 3.2 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Framework 
The stochastic uncertainty quantification methodology utilized in this study is shown in 
figure 3.2. Generally, uncertainties may either be model-related or input parameter related. 
In this study, the models implemented in the best estimate code were assumed good enough 
and the code was treated as a black box. The effect of propagating uncertainties in input 
parameters through the code was the main goal in the above framework. 
Assign probability distributions to characterize uncertain input parameters: this step 
is one of the most important steps in the framework. Studies had been conducted in this 
area due to its fundamental importance. Examples of such studies reported in literature 
include, Hora and Iman [85]; Bonano and Apostolakis [86]. Practical experience over the 
years has shown that specifying quantile (minimum, maximum) values would yield better 
outcomes compared to specifying particular distributions to characterize uncertain input 
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Experts may find it easier to justify specific quantile values than to justify specific 
distributions. Normal, uniform or lognormal are the types of distributions that are used. 
These distributions are available for use in the OpenCOSSAN software. A probability 
space is defined after assigning distributions to input parameters of interest. This space 
comprises three components; a sample space, a restricted subspace and a probability 
measure. The probability space can be represented as(𝑆, 𝐸, 𝑝). Where 𝑆 is the sample space, 
𝐸 is the restricted subspace of S and 𝑝 is the probability measure. 
Generate a number of random samples using the distributions in previous step: This 
step consists of sampling in the probability space. Random sampling involves selecting 
observations within the sample size according to the probability distribution defined by 
(𝑆, 𝐸, 𝑝). Each sample point is independently selected and there is no certainty of selecting 
sample points from any sub region of the sample space. Importance sampling procedure 
was developed to avoid inefficient sampling due to inadequate coverage of the sample 
space. This procedure ensures that parameters with low probability of occurrence but with 
significant effect on the response parameter are captured in the analysis. The Latin 
Hypercube sampling procedure further extends the concept of covering the parameter range 
[92]. The procedure essentially involves randomly pairing parameter values generated from 
each parameter space to form a Latin Hypercube sample. This process is however suited 
for only uncorrelated parameters. Inaccurate results will be obtained if it is applied to 
correlated parameters. Random sampling is a preferred statistical technique due to its easy 
implementation and the fact that it yields unbiased estimates of the means, variances and 
distribution functions. Large sample sizes are however required for implementing this 





and processes makes the stratified random sampling a desirable option. A priori knowledge 
is however necessary before this type of sampling can be implemented. Fault trees and 
event trees used in performing safety assessment in NPPs may be useful as a priori 
knowledge in defining stratified sampling procedures. On the whole, Latin Hypercube 
sampling yields a compromise importance sampling in the absence of a priori knowledge 
of relationships between input and output parameters [92]. 
The Monte Carlo method, a random sampling technique which is used in OpenCOSSAN 
was utilized for this study.  
Run CATHENA to generate the output parameter for all random input samples: This 
step involves model recalculations for all generated input samples in order to obtain the 
response parameter. This step constitutes the most computationally expensive part of the 
process. The best estimate thermal hydraulic code, CATHENA was used to perform model 
recalculations. A convergence test was performed to ascertain the adequacy of the number 
of random input samples simulated for the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis.  
Quantify uncertainty using results from CATHENA runs: the means and variances 
calculated from the simulation results are displayed as part of uncertainty quantification. 
The mean and variance may be less useful in deducing information on the response 
parameter of interest. This is due to the fact that useful information is lost during the 
process of calculating the mean and variance [92]. Distribution functions such as density 
functions provide more complete information on the sample being analyzed.  In this study, 
the first four moments (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis) of the response parameter 





Perform sensitivity analysis of the output due to the input parameters: This step 
comprises performing sensitivity analysis to assess the effects of uncertainty in the input 
parameters on the output parameter. Methods used include, scatter plots, regression 
analysis, rank transformation and correlation analysis. Regression analysis is performed on 
a linear model between the predicted output parameter (𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) and the input 
parameters (𝛼𝑖) as a formal method for performing sensitivity analysis. This can be written 
as, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝛼𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1       (3.1) 
The actual input parameters 𝛼𝑘𝑖 can be used to express the calculated output values in the 
following; 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝛼𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑      (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀)
𝐼
𝑖=1  (3.2) 
Where 𝜀 = 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the error between the calculated and 
predicted value of the output parameter and 𝑀 is the number of samples simulated. The 
predicted output values can be obtained from experiments. The unknown regression 
coefficients can be determined by minimization of the sums of squared errors, 






The regression coefficients and other indicators computed can be used to estimate the effect 
of individual input parameters on the global uncertainty observed in the output parameter 
[80]. In this study, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used as a sensitivity measure to 
determine the linear relationship between the input parameters and the output parameters 





3.2.4.1 Uncertainty Quantification using OpenCOSSAN 
OpenCOSSAN is a general purpose software developed by the Institute for Risk and 
Uncertainty at the University of Liverpool which can be applied to solve various 
engineering problems including uncertainty quantification, sensitivity analysis, reliability 
analysis and optimization. The software implements state of the art algorithms and methods 
in user friendly environments to produce reliable analytical results. 
The main features of OpenCOSSAN are user interfaces, software core components and 
interaction with 3rd party software. User interfaces comprise a graphical user interface 
(GUI) and a high-level programming language which is Matlab based. These Matlab scripts 
provide a flexible programming environment allowing users to modify solution sequences, 
exploration of data, and definition of algorithms and creating custom tools in order to solve 
specialized problems. Deterministic solvers such as CATHENA can be connected to 
OpenCOSSAN for stochastic analysis. Both intrusive and non-intrusive methods are used 
to enable such connections with deterministic solvers. Non-intrusive methods treat the 
deterministic solvers as black boxes where no modification is made to the solver [52]. In 
this method, interaction between third party solvers and OpenCOSSAN is achieved using 
input/output files usually in ASCII format for generating input configurations for the 
numerical analysis. This is the method that has been adopted in this study to link 
CATHENA to OpenCOSSAN in order to perform uncertainty quantification of selected 
input parameters and their estimated effect on output parameters in simulating a transient. 
Post-processor tools are used to extract output parameters from the deterministic solver. 
The interaction with the 3rd party solver involving input file manipulation and extraction 





An additional feature of the OpenCOSSAN software is the possibility to utilize high 
performance computing in problem solving. Since the stochastic analysis requires several 
computations of the deterministic models and these models are usually complicated, the 
use of distributed computer resources is desired. Running various components of the 
software on different platforms such as clusters comprising both Windows and Linux 
operating systems would significantly reduce computational times associated with solution 
sequences. The OpenCOSSAN software structure is summarized in figure 3.3 as adapted 
from [64]. 
 
Figure 3.3 OpenCOSSAN software structure 
As part of this study, a MATLAB script was written to link OpenCOSSAN with 
CATHENA. The script constituted the connector section of OpenCOSSAN which enabled 
the generation of random CATHENA input files based on the Monte Carlo method. The 
generated input files were simulated and the results were used to quantify input parameter 





3.2.5 Develop and Maintain FSN 
The dynamic tuning of the Fault Semantic Network (FSN) enables the representation of 
the dynamic nature of fault propagation in a plant. This process can be applied with the 
inclusion of protection layers and failure probabilities of these layers for risk estimation 
and safety verification. The development of FSN commences with the static, then the 
steady state and the dynamic. The static FSN comprises equipment details, process 
variables, possible faults and different plant states. The steady state involves the normal 
operation of the plant while the dynamic FSN deals with the dynamic nature of fault 
propagation usually simulated by CATHENA in this study.  A more detailed description 
of the dynamic FSN is given in section 3.2.4. In this study, results obtained from 













CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES 
4.1 Review 
 
In this chapter, selected case studies considered for application of the proposed FSN 
methodology are described. Fault propagation scenarios related to these case studies are 
defined and described. The steam generator is the primary heat sink of the reactor which 
removes the heat generated in the core. Faults associated with the steam generator are 
therefore important to be studied as they may pose significant threats to reactor safety. A 
study of a turbine trip scenario is also essential as its occurrence is credible and may have 
significant safety and economic impacts on operating plants. These scenarios were created 
as part of the simulator design. The various faults were therefore inserted into the 





4.2 Case Study 1: Steam Generator 
 
Figure 4.1 A CANDU steam generator [13] 
 
 
The Steam Generator (SG) is an equipment system in which heat from the primary heat 
transport system heavy water is transferred to the secondary side light water. CANDU is 
made up of four steam generators and most of the steam from the SG flows to the Turbine 
during normal operation. The Turbine converts the latent heat of the steam to rotational 
energy which is converted by the generator into electricity. Steam pressure in the SGs is 
controlled by regulating the flow through the Governor valves (GVs) and Atmospheric and 





stop valves (ESV) and GVs are fully opened under normal operating conditions, however 
the ESV can be closed to prevent steam flow to the Turbine to avoid damage to the Turbine 
during certain malfunctions. Since the SG is the major heat sink for the reactor primary 
heat transport system, the process variables associated with the SG have effects on other 
process variables such as reactor power, reactivity and the neutron flux which are neutronic 
parameters. 
The SG level is controlled within required limits to ensure adequate volume of water in the 
SG for the effective heat removal from the heat transport system. Steam flow, feed water 
flow and SG level measurements comprise the control algorithm that is used to control the 
SG level. Steam flow is compared with feed water flow and the difference gives the flow 
error. A positive error signal will increase the feed water control valve opening while a 
negative error signal will decrease the feed water control valve opening thereby either 
increasing or decreasing the SG level. 
4.2.1 Fault propagation Analysis of Feedwater Liquid Control Valve (FW 
LCV101) fails closed 
LCV101 is the feed water control valve that regulates flow from the condenser to SG1. 
After the above malfunction was inserted using the CANDU simulator, the effect on other 
process variables was monitored and this is described as follows to demonstrate the 





4.2.2 Effect on Reactor Neutron Power 
The reactor neutron power increased slightly at the initial stage of the malfunction. This is 
because the malfunction led to a decrease in the SG1 level, and this meant the heat 
produced in the reactor core was not being effectively removed and thus resulting in the 
initial power increase. The neutron power however decreased after about 250 seconds and 
this is due to the response of the reactor regulating system (RRS) to the initial reactor power 
increase. The RRS inserted negative reactivity into the system in order to achieve reactor 
stepback and this led to the subsequent power decrease.   
 


































4.2.3 Effect on SG1 Level 
As can be seen from figure 4.3, the SG1 level decreased following the insertion of the 
malfunction. As expected, the SG1 level decreased because of the lack of feed water flow 
as a result of the closure of LCV101.  
4.2.4 Effect on SG1 Pressure 
The decrease in SG1 level led to a corresponding increase in SG1 pressure however, SG1 
pressure decreased subsequently after the decrease of the reactor neutron power. 
4.2.5 Effect on Average Zone Level 
The CANDU consists of 14 liquid zone compartments that contain light water for the 
purpose of reactivity control. Increasing the water in the zones implies the addition of 
negative reactivity to the system as more neutrons are absorbed by the light water. 
Following the reactor power increase after the insertion of the malfunction, the average 

























































4.2.6 Effect on Pressurizer Level 
The pressurizer controls the pressure and inventory of the heavy water in the heat transport 
system. The pressurizer level is a function of reactor power. An increase in reactor power 
results in an increase in the pressurizer level in order to accommodate the swell in the 
coolant due to temperature changes. In similar manner, a decrease in reactor power results 
in a decrease in pressurizer level in order to accommodate the shrink in the coolant as a 
consequence of temperature drop. As can be seen in figure 4.6, the pressurizer level 
increases because of the initial power increase and decreases subsequently following the 
decrease of the reactor power. 
 
 


































Figure 4.6 Pressurizer level as a function of time during “FW LCV101 fails closed” 
transient  
 
The relationship between these process variables are explored using FSN in order to 
understand fault propagation and to take appropriate remedial actions following the 
occurrence of a fault. In table 4.4, some NPP systems and associated faults as well as 
process variables are listed. From figure 4.7, the FSN model of the fault propagation is 
seen. This illustrates the interconnection between process variables associated with various 
systems in the NPP where Δ𝑇 represents the time delay between states. As an example 
from figure 4.7, failure of the valve which is a mechanical component (FM-M1) led to an 
increase in reactor neutron power (FM-N1) which is a neutronic parameter. This resulted 
in steam generator 1 level increase (FM-T3) which is a thermal parameter. The 
relationships between the process variables helps in the understanding of fault propagation 
in terms of time delay between reaching different plant states as well as the strengths 


































Figure 4.7 FSN model of Case study 1: Steam Generator 
Table 4.1 gives the definitions and descriptions of the codes used in the FSN model of the 
case study. From figure 4.7, it is clear that a fault in a mechanical component affects both 
neutronic and thermal hydraulic components with the respective time delays shown in 
figure 4.7. This makes it important for establishing the interactions between process 









Table 4.1. Definition of codes  





Failure mode in mechanical 
component 





Failure mode in neutronic 
system 
 
Neutron power increase 












SG1 level decrease 
SG1 pressure increase 
Pressurizer level increase 
















The construction of FSN is commenced by the development of a database comprising; 
hazard scenarios, equipment, failure modes and process variables. The hazard scenarios 
are defined and linked with the propagation of each failure mode. The consequences of 
failures are also defined as well as the associated risks. Table 4.2 and 4.3 show examples 







Table 4.2. FSN knowledge base example 1 
Equipment Equipment ID Process Variables 
Input                                          Outputs 
Steam Generator 1 20%-100% 
nominal thermal 
power in CANDU 
- SG level 
- FW flow rate 
- Steam flow  





Table 4.3. FSN knowledge base example 2 
Failure Mode Failure ID Description Consequences 
LCV fails open 
 
 














Liquid control valve 
fails in open 
position. 
 
Liquid control valve 
fails in the closed 
position. 
 




- Low SG1 
level. 






- Turbine trip 














4.3 Case Study II: Turbine Trip in a NPP 
The Turbine converts the heat energy of the steam from the Steam Generator (SG) to 
rotational energy. In a CANDU, the Turbine is made up of a high pressure stage followed 
by three parallel low pressure stages. The steam, Turbine, Generator and Feedwater system 
is very important to CANDU operation since it serves as the normal heat sink for the energy 
produced by the reactor. The Generator which is connected to the Turbine converts the 
rotational energy of the Turbine to produce electricity. The CANDU Turbine, Generator 
system is shown in figure 4.8. 
 






4.3.1 Fault Scenario Description 
A turbine trip event is classified as an American Nuclear Society (ANS) condition II and 
may result in a reactor trip, at worst. A turbine trip can be initiated by different initiating 
events including, generator trip, low condenser vacuum, low bearing oil, turbine thrust 
bearing failure, turbine overspeed, steam generator HI-HI water level, Electro-Hydraulic 
(E-H) DC power failure or by a manual trip. Following a Turbine trip, steam flow to the 
Turbine is abruptly stopped and steam dump is initiated (Krsko SAR, 2012). The loss of 
steam flow leads to an increase in the steam generator temperature and pressure. In the 
event of a Turbine trip, steam discharge valves (Condenser Steam Discharge Valves 
(CSDVs) and Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valves (ASDVs)) are open to bypass steam 
to the Condenser and to the Atmosphere in order to prevent a ‘poison-out’. The Main Steam 
Safety Valve (MSSV) can however be opened if a failure of CSDV and ASDV should 
occur. In this study, the following process variables are used; SG flow (kg/s), SG pressure 
(MPa), SG level (m), Reactor Thermal Power (%), Reactor Outlet Header (ROH) pressure 
(MPa), Reactor Inlet Header (RIH) temperature (0C) and the Reactor Regulating System 
(RRS) reactivity insertion (mk). And the components of the CANDU involved in this case 
study include, SG, Steam Discharge Valves (ESVs, GVs, CSDVs, ASDVs, MSSVs), RIH, 
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EQ3 SG Pressure PV3 SG HI HI F3 
CSDV EQ4 SG Level PV4 Turbine 
Over speed 
F4 
ASDV EQ5 SG flow PV5 SG Temp. 
High 
F5 





MSSV EQ7   SG flow 
Low 
F7 
RIH EQ8   Pressurizer 
level Low 
F8 
ROH EQ9     
 
4.3.2 Fault Propagation Scenario 
We consider the fault propagation of a Turbine trip for our analysis and this scenario is 
summarized in figure 4.9. A Turbine trip results in temperature and pressure increase in 
the SG shell as well as an initial increase in coolant temperature and pressure. The 
Emergency stop Valves (ESVs) and Governor Valves (GVs) are closed immediately after 
a Turbine trip. This is to stop steam flow to the Turbine, the CSDVs and ASDVs are then 





the Steam Discharge Valves (SDVs) work properly to prevent a reactor trip or the opening 
of MSSVs. 
A reactor trip is undesirable because it leads to loss of electrical power to the grid and could 
be a very huge financial loss. Also a reactor trip may lead to loss of offsite power and both 
of these situations are extremely undesirable. 
 
Figure 4.9 Fault propagation scenario of case study 2: Turbine trip 
In figure 4.9, the vertical lines represent the independent protection layers that have been 
designed to prevent the propagation of the fault from one stage to the next while the boxes 
represent various plant states. In the event that these protection layers do not work properly 





4.3.3 Updating FSN 
Fault propagation scenarios are defined based on historical data initially and later updated 
using real time data. Figure 4.10 shows the FSN model where each node represents 









































CHAPTER 5: PROPOSED SIMULATION MODELS 
5.1 Review 
In this chapter, the proposed simulation models are presented and described. The Fault 
Semantic Network methodology proposed to be applied for fault propagation analysis and 
safety verification is explained in detail. The best estimate code, CATHENA used for 
simulating transients is also described with a sample problem. The chapter concludes with 
a presentation of the stochastic uncertainty quantification model applied to the Edward’s 
pipe blowdown problem. 
5.2 Fault Semantic Network 
In view of the challenges mentioned in section 1.2, this study proposes the use of Fault 
Semantic Network (FSN) to perform fault propagation analysis with reduced error between 
simulation and real time. This approach will involve the establishment of relationships 
between process variables associated with different components of the NPP following the 
occurrence of a fault. Examples of systems and components in the NPP with some 
associated faults and process variables are illustrated in table 5.1. FSN can be utilized as a 
fault detection, prediction as well as propagation analysis tool making its use advantageous 









Table 5.1. NPP systems, faults and process variables  
System Components Associated faults Associated process 
variables 
    
Neutronic Fuel  Fuel defect 
 Fuel failure 
 High neutron 
flux 




 Neutron flux 
 Reactor 
power 


















 High coolant 
inventory 






 SG pressure 
 SG level 
 Feed water 
flow 
 Steam flow 




 High voltage 
 Low voltage 





 Current  
 







 Valve failure 
 Valve 
opening 
 Flow rate 

















 High dose 












Semantic Networks are structures used to depict the relationship between various concepts. 
These networks consist primarily of nodes and arcs. The nodes represent concepts while 
the arcs represent the relationship between the nodes. An example of a semantic network 
is shown in figure 5.1.                      
 
Figure 5. 1 Semantic Network Structure 
 
Semantic networks are applied in different fields to model systems by linking various 
concepts based on the relationship that exist between them. Connections between nodes is 
achieved by means of a reasoning mechanism. FSN is an application of Semantic Networks 
to represent various faults, their causes as well as consequences in a system. The nodes in 
FSN represent various faults/causes/process variables and the link between the nodes 
represent the dependencies between them. Directed arcs are used to indicate the 
connections between the nodes. For instance, two nodes randomly selected are linked by a 





of a particular fault. The strength of connections between nodes depend on the type of 
interaction that exist between them. 
In applying FSN to a complex system such as a NPP, certain steps need to be followed. 
These steps are illustrated by describing a faulty condition in a Steam Generator. A 
decrease in steam generator level as monitored on a plant control console maybe caused by 
various conditions. Some of these causes may include decrease feed water flow, irrational 
flow sensor or a faulty control valve. FSN is used in this study to construct fault 
propagation scenarios in order to enhance the performance of the Fault diagnostic systems 
and to achieve real time safety verification of NPPs. FSN is constructed based on ontology 
structure of fault models based on process object oriented methodology (POOM) in which 
failure mode (FM) is described using symptoms, anablers, variables, causes and 
consequences. Rules are associated with each transition of the causation model in FSN. For 
example, failures related to loss of feedwater might be associated with rules such as 





(Structure= steam Generators) 
   And (PV= SG Level) 
   And (Dev= Low feedwater flow) 
(FM= Loss of feedwater) 
5.2.1 Process Variable Representation by Nodes 
Nodes in FSN represent various process variables and plant states. It is important to identify 
which variable each node represents and what initial values must be assigned to each node 
as well as the state of each node. In a dynamic system, the values of nodes change however, 
at any time nodes must be assigned one value. Nodes are either classified as Boolean, 





(F). Ordered values are qualitative description of the node such as high, low or medium. 
Integral values are quantitative values assigned to nodes. 
5.2.2 FSN Structure 
The FSN represent both qualitative and quantitative relationship between process 
variables. This structure is based on POOM. POOM enables the construction of a process 
model in either static, dynamic or functional states. In the static FSN, faults are related with 
structures such as steam generator, feed valve, bleed valve or control valve. In the dynamic 
FSN, faults are related with the dynamic behaviour of a system such as less flow, more 
flow and power surge. In the functional FSN, faults are related with the operation of a 
system such as start-up, normal operation and shutdown.  
5.2.3 Node Connections 
The relationship between nodes in FSN which is a representation of the interactions 
between process variables and various plant states can be done using different methods 
such as probabilistic, fuzzy logic and mathematical models.  
For the probabilistic method, a probability value is assigned to each possible combination 
of a node to other neighbouring nodes as either parent or child. The probability values 
assigned indicate the likelihood of progressing from one node to the other. This is useful 
in fault propagation analysis in which various stages of a fault can be predicted based on 
these probabilities that may be obtained from historic data and expert knowledge. 
For the Fuzzy method, IF-THEN rules are used to describe the transition from one node to 





fuzzy rules give estimations of likely plant states during a fault or transient. For instance, 
fuzzy rules applied to the steam generator in NPP may include; IF feedwater flow=Low 
THEN Failure Mode=Low Steam Generator Level. 
For the Mathematical modeling approach, mathematical equations comprising various 
functions are used to specify the relationship between nodes. These equations express the 
relation between dependent and independent process variables. Genetic Programming is a 
method that can be used to establish these types of relations between nodes/variables. 
5.2.4 Dynamic FSN 
Changes in plant conditions and states can be modeled by the FSN. In the dynamic FSN, 
new data obtained from sensors or by running simulations is used to update process 
variables by implementing a reasoning process. The reasoning process enables the mapping 
between process variables both qualitatively and quantitatively. Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) was implemented as a tool to achieve reasoning in FSN and applied to fault 
propagation analysis in this study. The reasoning maybe diagnostic, predictive, inter-causal 
or combined. 
In diagnostic reasoning, symptoms of a fault are first identified and the likely causes are 
obtained as output of the reasoning. A low steam generator level maybe considered a 
symptom and a low feedwater flow or irrational flow sensor maybe likely causes. 
In predictive reasoning, faults are predicted without the knowledge of symptoms. For 
example, decreasing the feedwater control valve will result in low steam generator level. 





In combined reasoning, a combination of any or all the other types of reasoning is used to 
achieve the desired outcome.  
5.2.5 Implementing FSN  
Formal language is proposed to represent process domain knowledge and safety control 
rules as explained in [7]. These rules are initially defined in generic form based on domain 
knowledge, i.e regardless of plant specific knowledge and then further explained for plant 
specific knowledge based on observations. A risk element is identified for each hazard or 
fault propagation scenario from the root causes to the final consequences. Three possible 
risk elements associated with consequence-1 are shown in figure 5.2, they include 
 Cause-1         failure-1         consequence-1 
 Cause-2         failure-1         consequence-1 
 Cause-3         failure-1         consequence-1 
 
Where 
CaFr1= frequency of cause-1 
FPr1= Probability of failure 1 occuring as a result of any cause. 
CoPr1= Probability of consequence-1 occuring. 
Colm1= Total impact of consequence-1. 
For independent events, the total risk associated with consequences 1, 2 and 3 are 





Risk (Consequence-1)= [(CaFr1+CaFr2+CaFr3)×FPr1×CoPr1]×Colm1  (5.1) 
Risk (Consequence-2)= [(CaFr1+CaFr2+CaFr3)×FPr2×CoPr2]×Colm2  (5.2) 
Risk (Consequence-3)= [(CaFr1+CaFr2+CaFr3)×FPr3×CoPr3]×Colm3  (5.3) 
For dependent events, Bayesian theorem can be used to determine the total risk based on 
dependencies for cause-1, 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 5. 2 FSN model for NPP 
 
The FSN consists of two parts of static off-line and dynamic online models. Static FSN 
comprises faults, failures, hazards and accidents that are linked in the form of causation 
models associated with process equipment while dynamic FSN involves the use of dynamic 
simulated or real time data that can be obtained from sources such as, operation, 





propagation scenarios after which operational scenarios for different fault propagation 
scenarios from real time data or simulation are identified.  
5.2.6 FSN Implementation in Existing NPPs 
 
The FSN methodology as described in the preceding sections can be implemented in 
existing NPPs for fault diagnosis and safety verification. This process is represented in 
figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 FSN application in existing NPPs 
In figure 5.3, a database is constructed consisting of various faults, process variables and 
consequences of faults. This database is based on expert knowledge of the NPP, operational 
history as well as from simulation. A fuzzy rule base is then formulated from the database 
for various systems and associated faults in an NPP. After the rule base is completed, the 





available at the operating stations. Posterior probabilities can then be obtained after 
simulating the BBN. Both plant operators and regulators can query the BBN for various 
purposes including: 
1. Estimating fault propagation scenarios based on evidence entered in the BBN using 
the inference mechanism. 
2. Diagnosing likely causes of faults based on process variable observation. 
3. For safety verification which is useful for safety protection system design. 
In the proposed  method above, the FSN is the structure of the solution approach while 
BBN and fuzzy logic are both computational engines utilized in the FSN structure. 
5.3 CATHENA 
Canadian Algorithm for Thermalhydraulic Network Analysis (CATHENA) is a one 
dimensional, two-fluid non-equilibrium system thermalhydraulics code developed by 
AECL/CNL mainly for the analysis of postulated Loss of Coolant (LOCA) events in 
CANDU reactors. The use of CATHENA to perform reactor simulations for transient and 
postulated accident scenarios is relevant to this study since the safety analysis of a reactor 
based on fault propagation scenarios is the main objective of this study. The conservation 
equations for mass, momentum and energy are solved for the two phases (liquid and 
vapour) in CATHENA. Flow-regime-dependent constitutive relations for wall shear 
account for momentum transfer between the fluid and the pipe surfaces. 
The numerical solution method used is a staggered mesh (i.e. a node consists of scalars 





of liquid and vapour between nodes), semi-implicit, finite-difference method that is not 
transit-time-limited [69]. Conservation of mass is obtained using a truncation error 
correction technique. Mass conservation is important in predicting 2-phase flow because 
of its known sensitivity to small changes in mass inventory. Additionally, the length of the 
transients makes them vulnerable to the accumulation of small errors which can adversely 
affect the solution. Sparse matrices are therefore solved in the code due to the stiffness of 
the problem. 
Heat transfer from metal surfaces is handled by a complex wall heat transfer package 
known as the Generalized Heat Transfer Package (GENHTP). A set of flow regime-
dependent constitutive relations describe energy transfer between the fluid and the pipe 
wall or fuel element surfaces. Heat transfer by conduction within the piping and fuel is 
modelled in the radial and circumferential directions. Radiative heat transfer and the 
zirconium-steam reaction can also be included during modeling. Component models which 
describe the behavior of pumps, valves, steam separators, and discharge through breaks are 
available to complete the modelling of reactor systems. A more detailed description of the 
CATHENA code can be found in [70, 71]. 
5.3.1 Edward’s Blowdown Problem 
In order to demonstrate the use of CATHENA for transient simulations, a simple pipe 
blowdown problem is selected [72]. A 4.0 m. long pipe filled with water at 240 deg C 
pressurized to 7 Mpa (70 atmospheres). The pipe has a rupture disc at one end which is 
opened starting at t=0 over a period of 0.003 seconds, and the pipe allowed to depressurize. 





immediately flashes into steam and begins to rapidly exit the pipe into the environment. 
Depressurization moves along the pipe towards the closed end, resulting in vapor 
generation and continued flow out of the opening. 
 
Figure 5. 4 Edward’s Pipe Blowdown Problem [72] 
 
5.3.1.1 Input Description 
The CATHENA [69] Idealization/modelling contains various sections that describe the 
problem and defines control parameters for the simulation. They include: 
1. ” PROBLEM TITLE”- this describes the problem. 
2. “CONTROL PARAMETERS”– this contains data that specify start/end times, 
output frequency and time step control.  
3. “COMPONENTS”- describes the geometry of the various systems in the model. 





4. “COMPONENT CONNECTIONS” – shows how the components are connected to 
form a hydraulic network. 
5. “BOUNDARY CONDITIONS”- identifies the conditions at the boundaries of the 
problem. These are classified as reservoir, flow or heat boundary conditions. 
6. “SYSTEM MODELS”- enables the modelling of physical systems such as pumps, 
valves, discharge and junction resistance. 
7. “SYSTEM CONTROL MODELS”- contains the output models. Writes selected 
data to user-specified disk files. 
8. “INITIAL CONDITIONS”- describes the physical conditions (pressure, enthalpies 
and void) that apply to each component in the network at the start of the simulation.  
The results of the above example are presented and discussed in chapter 7. 
5.3.2 Uncertainty Quantification for Edward’s Pipe Blowdown Problem 
 
The stochastic method for uncertainty quantification was applied in the form of the Monte 
Carlo method to the Edward’s pipe blowdown problem. The OpenCOSSAN software was 
used with modifications to simulate this scenario. Three input parameters were selected 
namely, the initial pressure, the initial temperature and reservoir pressure which was a 
boundary condition. The details of the stochastic model for this problem are as follows: the 
reservoir pressure was considered to be a constant value of 1.013E+05 for all input 
samples, a random variable set was generated for the initial pressure which was assumed 





variable set was generated for the initial temperature which was assumed to follow a 
uniform distribution with a lower bound of 200 and an upper bound of 300. 
Random variable sets were generated for the input parameters described above. A cossan 
readable input file was created which is a modification of the main CATHENA input file. 
This file contains information that is scanned and used to generate sample input files 
subsequently. The connection between OpenCOSSAN and CATHENA is established 
using the connector script. A total number of 420 random variable input parameter sets 
were generated from the Monte Carlo model thereby creating 420 different CATHENA 
input files after simulation. All the CATHENA input files created were subsequently 
executed and the outputs were analyzed for uncertainty quantification. Results and analysis 
are presented in chapter 7. 
Table 5.3. Stochastic input model description 






















CHAPTER 6: UNCERTAINTY QUANTIFICATION FOR 
RD-14 TEST FACILITY 
6.1 Review 
In this chapter, uncertainty quantification performed using the methods developed in 
chapter 3 is presented. A small break LOCA transient simulated by the RD-14 test facility 
is described in detail and the uncertainty quantification results for this facility are 
presented. Uncertainty in selected input parameters was quantified by estimating their 
effect on the output parameters. The transient scenario was created by CNL based on 
postulation. The scenario was simulated and results were used for subsequent analyses. 
6.2 RD-14 Facility Description 
The RD-14 is a thermal–hydraulic test facility which has most of the important 
characteristics of a CANDU primary heat transport system. Figure 6.1 shows a simplified 
schematic of the RD-14 facility [72] and figure 6.2 shows the nodalization of the facility 
used for CATHENA simulation. The facility is a pressurized-water loop (10 MPa nominal) 
with a geometry similar to a typical CANDU reactor. It has two horizontal channels of 
length 6 meters and total power of 11 MW. These are connected to end-fitting simulators 
representing 2 passes through a reactor core. Each test section consists of 37 electrically 
heated fuel-element simulators of almost the same heat capacity as reactor fuel. Heat 
removal from the primary circuit is achieved through 2 recirculating U-tube type steam 
generators. Primary fluid circulation is provided by 2 high-head centrifugal pumps, which 
generate channel flowrates similar to a single reactor channel. Full length feeders connect 





above-header piping includes the piping connected to two full-height, U-tube steam 
generators, and two bottom-suction centrifugal pumps. Steam generated in the secondary 
side of the steam generators is condensed in a jet condenser and returned as feedwater to 
the steam generators. A pressurizer (a surge tank) controls the primary-side pressure. The 
test facility is also equipped with ECC systems.  
The test sections, steam generators, pumps, and headers are arranged in order to obtain a 
scale similar to a typical CANDU reactor. The steam generators are also scaled such that 
their dimensions and characteristics are similar to those in a CANDU. The facility was 
designed to produce the same conditions in its primary system as those in a typical reactor 
under both forced and natural circulation [71; 81]. 
 
 






Figure 6.2 RD-14 Nodalization [72]  
6.2.1 Test B8603 
For the purpose of this study, the CATHENA model for test B8603 was simulated and the 
results were used to perform uncertainty quantification. Test B8603 is a small break LOCA 
in the inlet header conducted in the RD-14 facility and was reported in [82]. The break 
diameter was 7 mm, which is proportional to the cross sectional area of two feeders for a 
CANDU reactor LOCA. The break was located at the inlet header 4 [83]. The break was 
represented in the simulation by a fast-opening valve connected to an inlet header, and an 
orifice plate, scaled by the ratio of break area to loop volume to represent a feeder-sized 
break. Once the break valve was opened, single-phase liquid was discharged through the 





This scenario was simulated for 200 seconds to capture most of the events of interest such 
as: the blowdown, exponential pump ramp, secondary pressure ramp (crash cool), high-
pressure ECC and ECC refill. The secondary side pressure was set to 4.5 MPa and the 
emergency coolant injection (ECI) system was set to 5.5 MPa for the high pressure ECI 
and 1.3 MPa for the low pressure ECI. In this test, the surge tank was isolated 4 s before 
break initiation, and the power was tripped 20 seconds after break initiation to establish 
decay heat conditions [83]. 
6.3 Stochastic Uncertainty Quantification Model 
The uncertainty in output parameters due to input parameter uncertainty was estimated 
using the stochastic method as implemented in the OpenCossan software discussed in 
chapter 3. The RD-14 CATHENA model [72] was simulated and the results were used to 
quantify uncertainty. Two random variables were selected: the initial pressure in heated 
section 1 (TS1) and pressure in the surge tank which was treated as a boundary condition. 
A constant value of 10 MPa was chosen for the boundary condition pressure random 
variable while a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 10.4 MPa and an upper bound 
of 10.9 MPa was chosen as the initial pressure distribution. A matlab script was written in 
the OpenCossan environment which takes the original RD-14 model input and a cossan 
readable file as inputs. The cossan readable input file contains scripts that replace the 
selected input parameters with the random variable sets created. After, running the matlab 
script, a number of input files are created corresponding to the total number of samples 
specified in the script. All the random input files generated are simulated using CATHENA 





initial pressure in four nodes of TS1. This represents the uniform distribution that was 
assigned to the input parameter (initial pressure). The distribution was assigned based on 
similar studies in literature as well as expert judgement. 
 
Figure 6.3 Initial Pressure in TS1 distribution 
6.4 Output Pressure Results 
In this section, uncertainty quantification results for the output pressure in header 4 are 
presented. These results represent the effect of uncertainty in the initial pressure in 4 nodes 
of heated section 1 (TS1). Figure 6.4 shows the output pressure plotted against time for the 
simulated random input files. The total number of samples simulated was 300. In figure 
6.5 the output pressure distribution is presented. The distribution is fitted to a normal 
distribution and the first four moments (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis) are 
computed and indicated on the figure. In comparison to the normal distribution, the output 
distribution is observed to be positively skewed implying the output pressure distribution 
































has an asymmetric tail extending out towards more positive pressure values. The 
distribution also shows a spread of about 1.8 MPa around the mean pressure as well as a 
positive kurtosis.  
 
Figure 6.4 Output pressure plots for random input samples 
 
Figure 6.5 Output pressure distribution 


























































Figure 6.6 Output pressure convergence test: Top left (Mean Pressure), Top right 
(Standard deviation), Bottom left (Skewness), Bottom right (Kurtosis) 
Figure 6.6 shows results of the convergence of output pressure after simulating 300 random 
input samples. This is demonstrated by the convergence of the first four moments implying 
the adequacy of the number of random samples simulated to estimate the output parameter 
distribution. The uncertainty computed was 0.087% signifying a 1.84 MPa change in 

























































































output pressure expected given uncertainty in initial pressure of values uniformly 
distributed between 10.4 MPa and 10.9 MPa. 
 
Figure 6.7 Scatter plot of output pressure 
 
 

























Figure 6.8 Correlation coefficient between initial pressure and output pressure 
Figure 6.7 shows a scatter plot of output pressure against the input parameter (initial 
pressure). Figure 6.8 is a plot of the correlation coefficient between the initial pressure and 
the output pressure for a specified number of time steps. The figure indicates that there is 
a negative correlation between the initial pressure and the output pressure. 
6.5  Fuel Pin Temperature Results 
The effect of perturbing the initial pressure in 4 nodes of heated section 1 were investigated. 
Results presented in this section focus on the fuel pin temperature as output. Uncertainty 
associated with the input parameter is quantified by creating and simulating random 
CATHENA input files. A total of 300 random files were simulated and analyzed.  



























 Figure 6.9 Fuel pin temperature plots for random input samples  
Figure 6.9 shows a plot of the fuel pin temperature against time during the LOCA for all 
the random input samples. This figure indicates the range of the output parameter to be 
obtained given the range of input parameter variation due to uncertainty. 


























 Figure 6.10 Fuel pin temperature distribution  
Figure 6.10 presents the fuel pin temperature distribution obtained from simulating the 300 
random input samples. Also included in this figure are the first four moments (mean, 
variance, skewness and kurtosis) computed from the simulation results. The important 
characteristics of this distribution are; a spread of about 36.8 degrees Celsius around the 
mean temperature, a positive skewness and a positive kurtosis. The shape of the output 
parameter distribution is largely influenced by the distribution assigned to the input 
parameter. The uncertainty in fuel pin temperature estimated was 0.048%. This was 
obtained after taking a ratio of the standard deviation of fuel pin temperature to the 
experimental results expressed as a percentage. This signifies that a 36.79 degrees’ Celsius 
change in fuel pin temperature is expected given a change in initial pressure between 10.4 
and 10.9 MPa which is uniformly distributed. 




































Figure 6.11 Fuel pin temperature convergence: Left (Mean), Right (Standard Deviation) 
In figure 6.11, the convergence of fuel pin temperature is shown by plotting the mean (left) 
and standard deviation (right) for the random input samples. By the convergence theorem, 
it was not necessary to simulate additional samples in order to estimate the output 
parameter distribution accurately. The 300 input samples therefore proved to be adequate. 
 












































Figure 6.12 Fuel pin temperature against Initial pressure scatter plot 
 
Figure 6.13 Correlation coefficient between Fuel pin temperature and Initial pressure 
A scatter plot of the output parameter (fuel pin temperature) against the input parameter 
(initial pressure) is presented in figure 6.12. The input parameter was generated randomly 
















































using the lower and upper ranges specified earlier. In figure 6.13, the correlation coefficient 
between the initial pressure and fuel pin temperature is plotted for a specified number of 
time steps. The correlation coefficient is used in this study as a sensitivity measure to show 
the linear relationship between the input parameter and the output parameter. From figure 
6.13, it is seen clearly that there exists a negative correlation between the fuel pin 
temperature and the initial pressure.  
The results presented in this chapter are expected to be useful to regulators in providing 
further insights on safety margin reduction. With uncertainty quantification extended to 
capture other input parameters and systems in NPPs, a fair idea of code accuracies can be 
evaluated and confirmed. Additionally, code developers and users would also find these 
results useful, as they would be able to further understand the effect of input parameter 
uncertainties on output parameter predictions. 
6.6 Comparison of Uncertainty Quantification Results 
Uncertainty quantification results obtained in this study were compared with results 
obtained using other methods reported in literature. In table 6.1, this comparison is shown 
with 23% and 13% lower uncertainty estimates from this study for output pressure and 
temperature respectively. The results from literature were based on the CIAU methodology 
applied for a small break LOCA in a PWR. CIAU is an uncertainty quantification 
methodology that is made up of the UMAE method and RELAP5/MOD 3.2 [89]. It is worth 
bearing in mind the differences between the RD-14 test facility (based on CANDU design) 
considered in this study and the PWR considered in the CIAU study. Additionally, the 





for the scenario simulated [89]. In view of the similarities and differences in both studies 
as identified above, the most significant inference from this comparison is the fact that 
uncertainty results from this study are far below generally accepted limits.  
Table 6.1. Uncertainty quantification results 
Parameter Uncertainty (%) 
 This study CIAU 
Pressure 0.087            0.38 

















CHAPTER 7: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Review 
In this chapter, uncertainty quantification results obtained for the Edward’s blowdown 
problem are presented. Error reduction in Case Study 2 and risk estimation for a steam 
generator tube rupture as well as FSN results for case study 1 are also presented and 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a demonstration of the link between uncertainty 
quantification results and FSN.  
7.2 Uncertainty Quantification with OpenCOSSAN 
Uncertainty quantification was performed by studying the effect on output pressure 
obtained from CATHENA simulations by randomly varying the initial pressure and initial 
temperature as input parameters in the Edward’s pipe blowdown problem. Results 
presented here were obtained after connecting CATHENA with OpenCOSSAN for 
quantifying uncertainty in a stochastic manner. A total of 420 random variables were 
generated from the Monte Carlo simulation to represent the number of input samples that 
were simulated by CATHENA. 
Figure 7.1 shows a plot of output pressure against time for all the 420 input samples. This 
demonstrates varying outputs that can be obtained when the input parameters are varied. 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show scatter plots of output pressure against the inputs (initial pressure 
and initial temperature respectively). These plots show various levels of correlation 
between the inputs and the output parameter. A sensitivity analysis is however necessary 






Figure 7.1 Plots of Pressure for Random Input Samples 
 






Figure 7.3 Scatter plot of Output pressure vrs. Initial Temperature 
 





Figure 7.4 shows a histogram fit of the output pressure obtained for all the 420 input 
samples simulated. The fit compares the output probability distribution to the normal 
distribution. The first four moments (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis) are computed 
and shown on this figure. The output probability is rightly skewed. 
 







Figure 7.6 Convergence of output pressure standard deviation 
 






Figure 7.8 Convergence of output pressure kurtosis 
Figures 7.5-7.8 show the convergence of the output pressure which is demonstrated by 
computing the first four moments. From these figures, small fluctuations of output pressure 
are observed initially prior to its convergence as seen in the mean pressure (figure 6.5), 
standard deviation (figure 7.6), skewness (figure 7.7) and kurtosis (figure 7.8). The 
convergence indicates that sufficient samples have been simulated to give information on 








Figure 7.9 Mass flow rate results: Top left (mass flow rate distribution), Top right (mass 
flow rate plots for random input samples), Bottom left (mean mass flow rate 
convergence), Bottom right (standard deviation convergence of mass flow rate) 
In figure 7.9, results of the mass flow rate are presented. The mass flow rate values were 
obtained at the rupture disc end of the pipe. In this figure, the mass flow rate distribution, 
profiles for the simulated random input files and convergence of its mean and standard 
deviation are shown.  

















































































7.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis for Sample Problem 
In order to investigate the contribution of selected input parameters to the total output 
parameter uncertainty estimated in the previous section, a sensitivity analysis was 







       (7.1) 
Where 𝑥𝑖 is the random input parameter, ?̅? is the input parameter mean, 𝑦𝑖 is the output 
parameter for the ith random file, ?̅? is the output parameter mean,  𝑁 is the number of 
samples, 𝑆𝑥 is the input standard deviation and 𝑆𝑦 is the output standard deviation. The 
correlation coefficient provides a measure of the linear dependence between an input 
parameter and the output parameter. 
For the Edward’s blowdown problem simulated in this study, sensitivity analysis was 
performed by computing the correlation coefficient between the output pressure and two 
input parameters (initial temperature and initial pressure) for random input samples 
generated using the Monte Carlo sampling method. Figure 7.10 shows a plot of the 






Figure 7.10 Output pressure sensitivity to initial temperature and pressure for various 
time steps 
It can be observed from figure 7.10 that initially, the initial pressure contributed more to 
the uncertainty associated with the output pressure estimation. After about 0.15 seconds, 
although the plot shows a reversal of trends where the initial temperature seems to 
contribute more to output pressure uncertainty, the effect was in fact much less when 
comparing the effect of the two input parameters. Taking into consideration the total value 
of the correlation coefficient for the two input parameters for a specified number of time 
steps, it was determined that the contribution of the uncertainty in initial pressure to the 
global uncertainty observed for the output pressure was more compared to the contribution 
from uncertainty in the initial temperature. 





























Figure 7.11 Mass flow sensitivity to Initial temperature and pressure 
In figure 7.11, the correlation coefficient is plotted against time to establish the linear 
relationship between the input parameters (initial temperature and pressure) and the mass 
flow rate. From the figure it is evident that there is a positive correlation between the initial 
temperature and mass flow rate while a negative correlation is observed between the initial 
pressure and mass flow rate. The contribution of uncertainty in the initial temperature to 
the global uncertainty in mass flow rate is therefore expected to be more in comparison to 
uncertainty contribution from initial pressure. 
 


























7.3 Error Reduction for Turbine trip scenario 
 
 















































Figure 7.15 PV4 results with error function 
Figures 7.12-7.14 are plots of results obtained from the following: running CATHENA 
simulations, experimental data and from the CANDU simulator. These results relate to case 
study 2 described in chapter 4. In figure 7.12, PV1 (Core thermal power) values are plotted 






































CATHENA simulations [79], the curve labeled “SIMULATION” represents results 
obtained from the CANDU simulator while the curve labeled ‘REAL TIME’ represents 
experimental results [79]. The results presented in this section are related to the Uncertainty 
Quantification & Error reduction section in the methodology framework presented in 
chapter 3. 
It is seen clearly from figures 7.12-7.14 that simulation results do not match real time data 
and as demonstrated in table 2.1, these differences can be within control or safety limits 
and may have implications on response actions in the event of reactor transients. In figure 
7.15 however, a reduction is noticed in the error between simulation results by CATHENA 
and real time data after incorporating an error function. This error reduction is expected to 
go a long way in improving the accuracy of simulations in predicting fault propagation. 
The error function used for reducing the error in figure 7.15 is given by equation 7.2. 
3 20.0004 0.0064 0.0153 0.0544EF x x x       (7.2) 
Where x is the time after the Turbine trip. 























The MAE between CATHENA and real time data represented in figure 7.15 is 0.019 while 
the MAE between the error model and real time is 0.012. The lower value of MAE by the 
incorporation of the error model indicates a more accurate model in relation to seeking a 
solution close to real time. 
7.4 Risk Estimation for Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) 
SGTR Loss of RCS/LOCA





Loss of RCS inventory 
control
 
Figure 7.16 Fault propagation scenarios for Steam Generator Tube Rupture. 
During the operation of a NPP, several initiating events may lead to the propagation of 
faults in various components. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) is a phenomenon 
that is essential for consideration in performing safety assessment of SG integrity due to 
its degradation. Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) has been prescribed by the USNRC 
(NUREG-1570) for estimating the risks associated with operating a degraded SG. In this 
study, some results obtained from a PRA of SG integrity were used to perform safety 





Safety systems are designed as part of the plant to prevent the occurrence of initiating 
events. If, however these events do occur, there are still safety systems that act as 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) to check the propagation of faults. The vertical lines 
in figure 7.16 represent some of these IPLs which can be in the form of passive safety 
systems, inherent safety design or active safety systems. An initiating event may either lead 
to faults/failures or be curtailed by safety systems. 
Figure 7.16 depicts some fault propagation scenarios that may result in large releases of 
fission products following the rupture of SG tubes. These releases may result from core 
damage if protection layers or systems fail. The first fault propagation scenario involves 
the occurrence of SGTR followed by loss of reactor cooling system (RCS) and core heat 
removal. This scenario requires once-through cooling, if it fails, a high RCS pressure early 
core damage occurs. 
The second fault propagation scenario starts with SGTR occurring followed by a successful 
reactor trip and primary-secondary heat removal. The RCS however remains at high 
pressure and coolant inventory is assumed to be lost. RCS inventory control will be lost 
following the depletion of the Reactor Water Safety Tank (RWST). The High Pressure 
Safety Injection (HPSI) suction will be aligned to an empty containment sump. This 
scenario leads to a late core damage. 
Safety verification involves a comparison between the total risk associated with a process 
and the target risk. The target risk is usually set by the regulatory body such as the USNRC, 
CNSC or the IAEA. Risk estimation methods described earlier were used to estimate the 





compared with the risk target set by the USNRC for safety verification. In estimating the 
risk for a fault propagation scenario, the following equation was used. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 𝑖) = 𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖 ×. .× 𝑅𝑛 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑛                                                         (7.4) 
Where the meaning of the terms are described in table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Risk estimation parameters 
Symbol Description Magnitude 
R1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.7 
R2 Early core damage 5.5E-08 
R3 Late core damage 5.5E-08 
R4 Loss of RCS/LOCA 2.4E-15 
PFD1 Probability of failure on demand of IPL1 0.05 
PFD2 Probability of failure on demand of IPL2 0.01 
PFD3 Probability of failure on demand of IPL3 0.0045 
 
The total risk estimation is given as, 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                (7.5) 
From equation 7.4, the risk associated with fault propagation path 1 is estimated as, 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 1) = 𝑅1 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷1 × 𝑅2 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷2 × 𝑅3                                                     (7.6) 
= 2.7 × 0.05 × 5.5𝐸 − 08 × 0.01 × 5.5𝐸 − 08 





Risk associated with fault propagation path 2 is estimated as, 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 2) = 𝑅1 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷1 × 𝑅2 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷2 × 𝑅3 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷3 × 𝑅4                          (7.7)  
= 2.7 × 0.05 × 5.5𝐸 − 08 × 0.01 × 5.5𝐸 − 08 × 0.0045 × 2.4𝐸 − 15 
≈ 4.41𝐸 − 35     
Therefore, the total risk is estimated from equation 7.5 as, 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 1) + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ − 2) 
≈ 4.08𝐸 − 18 + 4.41𝐸 − 35 
≈ 4.08𝐸 − 18     
The USNRC safety goal states that the cancer fatality risk associated with exposure from 
NPP accidents to the population near an operating NPP should not exceed one-tenth of one 
percent [25]. The target risk considered in this study therefore was 1.0E-03. Since the 
estimated risk is far lower than the target risk, the SGTR accident considering the fault 
propagation scenarios evaluated is safe.  
The risk estimation results presented in this section were based on selected fault 
propagation scenarios related to SGTR accident. In order for a direct application of 
uncertainty quantification results in this context, the scenarios presented above need to be 
extended to include the analysis of more safety systems and their possible failure. As part 
of an extension of the current study in the future, a more comprehensive number of fault 
propagation scenarios would be evaluated. A direct application of uncertainty 





7.5 Results of CATHENA Simulation of Edward’s Blowdown Problem 
CATHENA simulation results are presented in this section. The model considered here has 
been described earlier in chapter 3. 
Mass flow rises from zero to about 160 kg/s within 0.02 seconds, then falls smoothly to 
almost zero by 0.4 seconds. The pressure near the ruptured disc drops off quickly as the 
water there becomes steam almost immediately, while the pressure at the closed end drops 
off more slowly. Pressure recovery starts at about 0.004 seconds. This is caused by a 
pressure wave being reflected off the closed end of the pipe and moving back towards the 
open end. Pressure then bleeds down to atmospheric by ~0.4 seconds. The void near the 
rupture disc goes from 0.0 to ~0.6 within about 0.04 seconds, then more slowly to 1.0 by 
~0.4 seconds. Void near the closed end rises more slowly, reaching ~0.2 by about 0.08 
seconds, then more quickly to ~0.8 by about 0.15 seconds, then approaching 1.0 
asymptotically by the end of the simulation. The above can be seen in figures 7.17-7.20. 
 



























Figure 7.17 Mass Flow Rate during pipe blowdown transient. 
 
Figure 7.18 Pressure (Entire simulation) during pipe blowdown transient. 
 
Figure 7.19 Pressure (Smaller time step) during pipe blowdown transient. 
















































Figure 7.20 Void Fraction during pipe blowdown transient 
 
7.6 FSN Results for Case Study 1 
In order to illustrate the FSN methodology described in chapter 3, an example of a steam 
generator used in CANDU and other NPPs is selected for this purpose. Table 7.2 shows 
the FSN for this case. The example shows symptoms that can be observed during plant 
operation and for each symptom, a semantic network may be defined as well as a prediction 
of the likely causes for observing such a symptom. Both Fuzzy Expert System (FES) and 
































Table 7.2. FSN case for steam generator system 
Sensor 
ID Name Location Description 
S1 LCV 101 Steam Generator Level Ctrl. 
Liquid control valve opening 
(%) 
S2 Flow Transmitter Steam Generator 1 inlet 






ID Symptom Impact Semantic Network (BBN/FES) Causes 
1 Low SG1 level 0.7 FES 1 C1, C3 
2 Low Reactor Power 0.3 BBN 1 C1, C2 
Cause ID Cause Impact   Diagnosis 
1 Impaction of particles 0.25   D1 
2 Incorrect Installation 0.25   D2 
3 Sensor Degradation 0.5   D3 
Diagnosis 
ID (Sensor, Features) Impact   Repair 
1 D1: (S1,F1) 0.69   R1 
2 D2: (S1,F2) 0.75   R2 
3 D3: (S2,F3) 0.45   R3 
Repair ID Repair Impact     
1 Clean Valve 0.33     
2 Proper Installation 0.33     






ID Name Description Detection 
F1 LCV 101 fails open Liquid Control valve fails in the open position 
LCV 101 remains at 
100% open, Steam 
Generator 1 level 
increase, Turbine trip 
F2 
LCV 101 fails 
closed Liquid Control valve fails in the closed position 
LCV 101 remains at 
0% open, Steam 
Generator 1 level 
decrease, Reactor trip 
F3 
SG1 FW FT 
Irrational 
Steam Generator 1 feedwater flow transmitter 
irrational 
Flow transmitter reads 
-1.0,  
Steam Generator 1 
level increase, Reactor 
neutron power decrease 
slightly 
 
Finally, the FSN is made up of a sensor component which describes some sensors that are 
used to measure and indicate the features of interest as well as a description of relevant 
features/faults and how they are detected. 
7.6.1 Utilizing Fuzzy Expert System (FES) in FSN 
 
Fuzzy logic can be utilized in representing human expert knowledge in a particular domain 
of application and in reasoning with that knowledge in order to arrive at useful inferences 
or actions. The conventional binary logic is crisp and allows for only two states (TRUE or 
FALSE). This logic is therefore not suitable for handling fuzzy descriptors, such as “fast”, 
“slow” and “weak”. Fuzzy logic permits the extension of binary, crisp logic to qualitative, 
subjective, and approximate situations, which characterize majority of real life and 
engineering problems. The application of fuzzy logic in control systems for example results 
in more optimal control of such systems. Fuzzy logic tolerates the use of imprecise data. 





incorporate such imprecise into a system has advantages over conventional techniques 
based on binary logic. The use of fuzzy logic in control systems for instance is also flexible 
compared to conventional control algorithms such as the proportinal-integral-derivative 
controller. Fuzzy reasoning is easy since the mathematical concepts that form the 
foundation of fuzzy logic are simple to understand. In fuzzy logic, the knowledge base is 
represented by if-then rules of fuzzy descriptors. An example of a fuzzy rule applied in 
FSN for the steam generator would be, “If the steam generator level is low and the neutron 
power is normal, then failure mode is “LCV fails closed”, which contains the fuzzy 
descriptors low and normal. A fuzzy descriptor is usually represented by a membership 
function. This function assigns a membership grade between 0 and 1 for each possible 
value of the fuzzy descriptor it represents where a membership grade of 1 implies a 100 % 
certainty of an element in that set. 
A fuzzy inference system has been demonstrated for the selected steam generator system 
by implementing the following processes in order to arrive at a set of fuzzy rules applicable 
in the FSN. 
1. A set of linguistic rules (protocols) made up of fuzzy variables as inputs (process 
variables) and output (failure modes) were developed. 
2.  A set of membership functions for process output variables and input variables were 
obtained based on the knowledge of the system behavior. 
3. The “fuzzy AND” operation (min) and the “fuzzy implication” operation (min) were 





function Ri (a multidimensional array of membership values in the discrete case) for 
that rule. 
The steps outlined above were used with the aid of the CANDU 9 simulator to obtain the 
following rule base, which was implemented using the “fuzzy logic” toolbox in MATLAB 
[87]: 
1. IF “NP” IS “N” AND “SGL” IS “H” AND “LCVO” IS “VH” THEN “Failure 
Mode” IS “LCV101 fails open” 
2. IF “NP” IS “L” AND “SGL” IS “VH” THEN “Failure Mode” IS “LCV101 fails 
open” 
3. IF “NP” IS “VL” AND “SGL” IS “L” AND “LCVO” IS “VH” THEN “Failure 
Mode” IS “TURBINE TRIP” 
4. IF “NP” IS “N” AND “SGL” IS “L” AND “LCVO” IS “VL” THEN “Failure 
Mode” IS “LCV101 fails closed” 
5. IF “NP” IS “N” AND “SGL” IS “VL” AND “LCVO” IS “VL” THEN “Failure 
Mode” IS “LCV101 fails closed” 
6. IF “NP” IS “L” AND “SGL” IS “VVL” THEN “Failure Mode” IS “LCV101 fails 
closed” 
7. IF “NP” IS “N” AND “SGL” IS “H” AND “LCVO” IS “H” THEN “Failure 
Mode” IS “FW FT irrational” 
8. IF “NP” IS “N” AND “SGL” IS “H” AND “FF” IS “VL” THEN “Failure Mode” 





Where, N=Normal, H=High, VH=Very High, L=Low, VL=Very Low, VVL=Very Very 
Low, NP=Neutron Power, SGL=Steam generator 1 level, LCVO=LCV101 opening (%), 
FF=Feed Flow and FW FT=Feedwater flow transmitter. 
Figures 7.21-7.26 show plots of fuzzy surfaces and membership functions for the fuzzy 
inference system described above. The triangular membership function was selected due 
to its extensive use in literature. 
 






Figure 7.22 ‘SGL’ against ‘LCVO’ fuzzy surface plot 
 






Figure 7.24 ‘SGL’ membership functions 
 






Figure 7.26 Failure Mode membership functions 
 
 
7.6.2 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) Application in FSN 
 
BBN mainly involves the compact representation of joint probability distributions using 
conditional independence. It is made up of both qualitative and quantitative parts. The 
qualitative part is referred as directed acyclic graph (DAG) which comprises nodes 
(random variables) and edges (direct influence). The quantitative part comprises a set of 
conditional probability distributions. BBN is useful due to the possibility of representing 
knowledge in a modular form as well as internal algorithms for inference and learning. 
In applying BBN for FSN, posterior probabilities (evidence based probabilities of events) 
are used to explain the causes of faults based on observed symptoms. Human expert 





BBN. The inference mechanism in BBN is utilized in the FSN either to diagnose, predict 
or identify inter-causal faults. Symptoms of faults are entered as evidence and the inference 
mechanism is able to identify likely causes in the diagnosis. Based on the evidence of 
process variable values, faults can be predicted using the inference mechanism. A 
combination of causes can also be used to infer a symptom using the inference mechanism. 
BBN is constructed for the steam generator case of a CANDU NPP. Fault propagation, 
symptoms and node probabilities are assigned based on scenario simulation using the 
CANDU 9 simulator [84] as well as expert knowledge of the plant operation. 
 





In figure 7.27, the BBN structure for steam generator faults is shown. Likely causes of 
faults are indicated together with the various faults and the resulting observations. The prior 
probabilities as well as the posterior probabilities obtained after learning and inferencing 
the BBN are also shown in the figure. The BBN can be queried in various ways in order to 
obtain posterior probabilities as described below: 
Diagnostic Query 
If ‘High SG1 level (x)’ is observed, what is the probability that the cause is ‘Impaction of 
particles (a)’? 
Answer:  
P(a|x) = 29 % True 
71 % False 
Therefore, there is a 29 % probability that ‘High SG1 level (x)’ observed was caused by 
the Impaction of particles (a)’. 
Predictive Query 
What is the probability of observing a ‘Turbine trip (z)’ given that ‘Pressure spikes (b)’ 
had occurred? 
Answer: 
P(z|b) = 54 % True 





Therefore, there is a 54 % probability of observing a ‘Turbine trip (z)’ following the 
occurrence of ‘Pressure spikes (b)’. 
Inter-causal Query  
What is the probability that a ‘Turbine trip (z)’observed was caused by a combination of 
‘Pressure spikes (b)’ and ‘Bias and drifting (j)’? 
Answer: 
P(z|b, j) = 52 % True 
48 % False 
Therefore, there is a 52 % probability that ‘Turbine trip (z)’ observed was caused by a 
combination of ‘Pressure spikes (b)’ and ‘Bias and drifting (j)’. 
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Figure 7.28 Safety Margins Concept [89] 
In the conservative approach, the results of parameter estimates are limited by acceptance 
criteria set by the regulatory bodies. In the best estimate approach, uncertainty ranges are 
used to express parameter results calculated as shown in figure 7.28. Safety margins can 
therefore be reduced with the knowledge of uncertainties and sensitivities associated with 
code calculations as has been shown in this thesis. 
The Fault Semantic Network (FSN) can be linked with uncertainty quantification results 
in the following manner: in FSN, rules are used to describe the transition between different 
plant states. These rules can be updated using knowledge obtained from the uncertainty 
quantification exercise. The updated rules reflect the fact that safety margins would be 
reduced without compromising the acceptance criteria as long as the upper limit of the 
uncertainty range is not exceeded. FSN rules related to the RD-14 facility can be updated 
with the uncertainty quantification results as follows: 
(1) If “Pressure” is less than 7.4 MPa and less than 5.56 MPa, then “Failure Mode” 
is “Unsafe”. 
(2) If “Pressure” is greater than 7.4 MPa and less than 9.24 MPa, then “Failure Mode” 
is “Safe”. 
(3) If “Pressure” is greater than 7.4 MPa and greater than 9.24 MPa, then “Failure 
Mode” is “Unsafe”. 






(5) If “Temperature” is greater than 270 0C and less than 307 0C, then “Failure Mode” 
is “Safe”. 
(6) If “Temperature” is greater than 270 0C and greater than 307 0C, then “Failure 
Mode” is “Unsafe”. 
 
The above rules can be continuously updated in the FSN rule base and this can be used to 
perform safety verification for any operating plant under various conditions. Under any 
normal or abnormal operational scenario, the FSN can be utilized to provide insight into 
the plant safety status. This insight would be based on the defined rule base. In this manner, 
the use of uncertainty quantification results and FSN would provide a good means for 
safety verification and enhancement. 
Fuzzy rules which form the integral FSN rule base will be updated using the above results. 
The process of updating these rules will include modifications of the rules to reflect these 
results. Tuning of the FSN will involve changing the fuzzy membership functions for 
process variables as inputs and failure modes as outputs. The updated membership 
functions will then be applied to the overall system and new evidence of plant conditions 










CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Review 
This chapter concludes this thesis and presents some recommendations. The main 
innovative contributions of the thesis are outlined and major aspects of the methods 
developed in the thesis are highlighted. Main results obtained and their significance are 
also presented. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further studies and useful 
applications of results presented in this thesis. 
8.2 Conclusion 
This thesis has presented uncertainty quantification and fault diagnosis methods. It has also 
reviewed existing literature relevant to the study. The methodology framework based 
mainly on the stochastic uncertainty quantification approach and safety verification based 
on FSN were presented and some case studies were described. The issue of NPP safety is 
essential and this study is expected to enhance current safety analysis and verification tools. 
A stochastic uncertainty and sensitivity analysis method has been presented in this study. 
The methodology discussed has promising potential for safety analysis applications in the 
nuclear and other industries. Although computationally expensive in terms of time taken 
to complete code simulations, the use of high performance computing techniques is 
expected to minimize the effect of such draw backs. 
The global uncertainty in output pressure was estimated by computing the standard 
deviation after varying two input parameters within specified ranges. The global 





rate was 0.57 %. The significance of the global uncertainty in terms of the input uncertainty 
contributions was obtained after computing the correlation coefficient between inputs and 
the outputs for a specified number of time steps. For the number of time steps considered, 
the total correlation coefficient between initial pressure and the output pressure was 
approximately 1.0 while that between the initial temperature and output pressure was 
approximately 0.6. This implies that there is approximately 1.73KPa change in output 
pressure expected given a 10 % covariance in initial pressure and an initial temperature 
uniformly distributed between 200 and 3000 C temperature. The initial pressure however 
contributes more to this uncertainty observed in the output pressure. For the mass flow, 
there is a 50.52 Kg/s change expected given a 10 % covariance in initial pressure and an 
initial temperature uniformly distributed between 200 and 3000 C. 
A methodology has been presented for fault propagation analysis in NPPs based on FSN. 
Both the fuzzy logic method and the Bayesian Believe Network which is based on 
conditional probability were used to demonstrate the FSN. The FSN uses expert 
knowledge, operational history and simulation results as input in developing a database for 
subsequent analysis. The fuzzy inference system consists of inputs (process variables) and 
outputs (failure modes) as well as membership functions. The BBN consists of estimated 
prior probabilities and posterior probabilities as well as an inference mechanism. 
A case study of faults associated with the steam generator in a CANDU was used to 
demonstrate the methodology presented. The results show that the FSN is capable of 
providing valuable information useful for plant safety and for executing effective 
maintenance activities. The proposed methodology when extended to more systems of an 





both operating organizations of NPPs as well as industry regulators may find this tool 
useful for safety verification purposes as well as for accident and disaster prevention. In 
this regard, the proposed solution method can serve as a valuable tool that gives insight to 
operators and decision makers in order to implement timely intervention to prevent 
catastrophic scenarios. 
Although the methods developed in this study were demonstrated using applications related 
to nuclear power plants, these methods can also be applicable in other industries and 
disciplines. In the automotive industry for example where unmanned vehicle technology is 
currently under research and development, the methods developed in this work can be 
useful in enhancing safety of automated driving when implemented. 
8.3 Innovative Contributions of this Study 
This study was undertaken to develop and implement methods for performing uncertainty 
quantification and to verify the safety of NPPs. The proposed methods were applied to 
quantify uncertainty and demonstrate safety verification in real world scenarios. The main 
contributions of this study are summarized as follows: 
8.3.1 Stochastic Uncertainty Quantification Framework 
1. A framework for performing uncertainty quantification for safety verification 
applications has been developed. The framework integrates conventional 
computational tools to facilitate uncertainty and sensitivity analysis with the 
advantage of providing more information to analysts and code developers on output 





approach, the proposed framework when implemented is expected to enhance 
understanding of safety margins when undertaking safety analysis. The stochastic 
uncertainty and sensitivity approach proposed will provide a valuable means of 
estimating distributions of safety important parameters that may be used by code 
developers, users and regulators to achieve better output during safety verification. 
2. The Fault Semantic Network (FSN) based on the Bayesian Belief Network was 
used to demonstrate safety verification in NPPs. This approach if extended to cover 
other plant systems would enhance safety analysis of existing plants throughout 
their life cycle. With the development of a comprehensive database of faults, 
process variables (PVs) and interactions between PVs, the FSN would play a 
significant role in fault diagnosis, propagation analysis and safety verification if 
implemented in existing plants. 
3. The link between FSN and uncertainty quantification results has been established. 
This will enable the updating of the FSN rule base for safety verification of 
operating plants under various conditions. The updated rule base can be used to 
effectively tune the FSN based on evidence. In this way, the status of any plant or 
process can be effectively estimated given the dynamic nature of conditions that 
may prevail at any given time. 
8.3.2 Case Studies 
The uncertainty quantification and safety verification methods proposed in this study were 
applied to a total of four case studies. Two transients (small break LOCA and pipe 





was performed. Two faults (liquid control valve failure and turbine trip) were simulated 
using the CANDU 9 simulator and the results were used to demonstrate safety verification 
with FSN. These cases are regarded credible with significant impacts on plant safety and 
operation.  
8.4 Recommendations and Future Work 
Based on the results obtained in this study, the following recommendations and an outlook 
on the future direction of the research are presented in this section. 
8.4.1 Recommendations 
To Plant Owners and Operators: It is recommended that current trends and best practices 
in performing safety analysis such as using the probabilistic approach is embraced. The 
probabilistic approach may be used as a supplemental methodology to the existing 
deterministic methods being used. In this way, safety and plant economics would be 
enhanced due to better understanding of realistic safety margins and limits.  
To Industry Regulators: It is highly commendable that regulatory bodies such as the 
CNSC and NRC are engaged with various stakeholders in conducting research in the use 
of stochastic methods for performing safety analysis. The use of best estimate codes 
supported by uncertainty and sensitivity analysis has been identified to play a major role 
in demonstrating the safety case of existing power plants as well as new builds. 
Particularly, extensive research is required in the use of stochastic uncertainty 
quantification methods such as in the coupling of neutronic and thermal hydraulic codes to 





To Code Developers: As identified in chapter 2, the sources of uncertainties associated 
with code simulations are many and the task of minimizing these uncertainties is a huge 
one. It is recommended that results from researchers such as those presented in this thesis 
be taken into account during code revisions and design. This would contribute to enhancing 
code accuracy in predicting complex processes such as transients that may occur in power 
plants. 
 
8.4.2 Future Work 
The following are proposed for the future direction of this research: 
8.4.2.1 Use of SUSA and Other Codes 
Input parameter uncertainty propagation was investigated in this study. Input parameters 
were varied and the effects on selected outputs were estimated. It is expected that other 
stochastic tools such as SUSA developed by GRS would be used to perform uncertainty 
and sensitivity analysis. SUSA facilitates the use of more input parameters than those used 
in this study. 
8.4.3 Proposed Implementation in Operating Plants 
The methods developed in this study are proposed to be implemented in existing operating 
plants such as Bruce Power, Pickering and Darlington. As an example, the following is a 
summary of such a proposal with Bruce Power comprising objectives, research activities, 






(1) Identify uncertainties, rank their importance and estimate their influence on safety 
parameter computations. 
(2) Avoid risk by reaching an acceptable quality level. 
(3) Demonstrate compliance with regulatory thresholds. 
8.4.3.2 Research Tasks 
(1) Perform uncertainty quantification for selected scenarios using stochastic methods 
(Phase 1). 
(2) Identify best estimate codes, select and simulate fault scenarios (Phase 1). 
(3) Perform sensitivity analysis for selected scenario with available methods such as 
SUSA and COSSAN-X (Phase-1). 
(4) Validate uncertainty quantification and sensitivity analysis results obtained (Phase-
1). 
8.4.3.3 Deliverables 
(1) Program Code: provide Bruce Power the code of the proposed system for safety 
verification and compliance support, which could run on their computer systems, 
as integrated with existing safety analysis systems. 






(3) Publication: publish two manuscripts to reflect the proposed innovation (1 
conference paper and 1 journal paper) (Phase-1). 
(4) Final Report: submit the final report, which includes simulation and test results 
using selected case studies and recommendations (Phase-1). 
8.4.3.4 Expected Benefits 
(1) Estimate the probability distributions of important safety parameters instead of 
single values of unknown accuracy. 
(2) Enhance the validation of thermal hydraulic codes for safety analysis applications. 
(3) Satisfy regulatory requirements on demonstrating safety margins and acceptance 
criteria for best estimate computer codes. 
(4) The sensitivity analysis would provide useful information for code improvement, 
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APPENDIX III: MATLAB SCRIPT FOR GENERATING RANDOM     
CATHENA INPUT FILES 
if isunix 
    Sexecutable='cat3_5drev2.exe.sh'; 
else 
    % TODO:  
    Sexecutable='cat3_5drev2.exe.bat'; 
end 
  
%% BE SURE OpenCOSSAN has been initialised 
  
% Reset the random number generator in order to obtain always the same 
results. 
% DO NOT CHANGE THE VALUES OF THE SEED 
OpenCossan.resetRandomNumberGenerator(51125) 
  
%% Tutorial Connector: CATHENA   
% 
  
% In this examples 3 quantities are connected with OpenCOSSAN 













% The outputs are collected from a file (edwards_press.dat)  
  
%% Create the Injector 
% An injector is screated by scanning the file PipeBlowdown.inp.cossan 
containing 3 indentifiers 
Sfolder=fileparts(mfilename('fullpath'));% returns the current folder 
SfilePath=fullfile(Sfolder,'Connector','CATHENA'); 
  
Xinj = Injector('Sscanfilepath',SfilePath,... 
                'Sscanfilename','PipeBlowdown.inp.cossan',... 
                'Sfile','PipeBlowdown.inp'); 
             
% Show the content of the identifier 
display(Xinj)              
%% Output files 
% The output is collected from the file edwards_press.dat  
% Since the data are written in a table format is convinient to use the 







Xte1=TableExtractor('Sdescription','Extractor for the tutorial 
CATHENA', ... 
    'Luseload',false,...  
    'LextractColumns',true, ... 
    'Srelativepath','./', ... % relative path to the Sworkingdirectory 
where result file is located 
    'Sfile','edwards_press.dat',... 
    'Nheaderlines',27,... 
    'Sdelimiter',' ',... 
    'CcolumnPosition',{6},... 
    'Soutputname','out');  
  
% It is also possible to read a single value or post processing the 
data 
% using a MIO function after the execution of the SOLVER.  
  
%% Construct the connector 
Xc = Connector('Stype','cathena',... solver identification 
    'Ssolverbinary',fullfile(SfilePath,Sexecutable),... Solver binary 
    'Sexeflags','',... execution flags 
    'Smaininputfile','PipeBlowdown.inp',... main input file 
    'Smaininputpath',SfilePath,... absolute path to the original main 
input file 
    'Sexecmd','%Ssolverbinary %Smaininputfile %Sexeflags',... 
construction of the execution command 
    'SpostExecutionCommand',[' cp ' eval('SfilePath') filesep  
'edwards_press.dat .'],... % SEE NOTE BELOW  
    'LkeepSimulationFiles',false,...  
    'CXmembers',{Xinj Xte1}); % objects included in the Connector 
  
% The SpostExecutionCommand is used to simulate the execution of the 
% solver. The output file is copied into the working directory and the 
% extracted by the TableExtractor. 
  
%% Define the model 
  
Xeval = Evaluator('CXmembers',{Xc}); % Members of the evaluator (one or 
more solvers) 
  
% Create the Model 
Xm = Model('Xinput',Xinput,'Xevaluator', Xeval); 
  
% Test the model performing a deterministic analysis 
Xout=Xm.deterministicAnalysis; 





% Set Simulation properties 
Xmc = MonteCarlo('Nsamples',300); 
  
%% Perform Monte Carlo 





APPENDIX IV: MATLAB SCRIPT FOR CREATING AND 
UPDATING BBN 
function [bnet, names, marg, loglik] = SGBBN() 




names = {'Impaction of particles(a)', 'Pressure Spikes(b)', 'Debris 
causing actuator failure(c)', 'Incorrect Installation(d)', 'Valve 
Cavitation(e)', 'High Temperature(f)', ... 
         'Sensor Degradation(g)', 'Lack of calibration(h)','Bias and 
Drifting (j)', ... 
         'LCV101 Fails Open(A)','LCV101 Fails Closed(B)', 'SG1 FW FT 
Irrational(C)', ... 
         'High SG1 level(x)', 'High SG1 Pressure(y)', 'Turbine 
Trip(z)', 'Low SG1 level(w)', 'Low Neutron Power(v)','High Avg Zone 
level(u)'}; 
ss = length(names); 
  
intrac = {... 
  'Impaction of particlea(a)', 'LCV101 Fails Open(A)'; 
  'Pressure Spikes(b)', 'LCV101 Fails Open(A)'; 
  'Debris causing actuator failure(c)', 'LCV101 Fails Open(A)'; 
  'Incorrect Installation(d)', 'LCV101 Fails Closed(B)'; 
  'Valve Cavitation(e)', 'LCV101 Fails Closed(B)'; 
  'High Temperature(f)', 'LCV101 Fails Closed(B)(C)'; 
  'Sensor Degradation(g)', 'SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)'; 
  'Lack of calibration(h)', 'SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)'; 
  'Bias and Drifting(j)', 'SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)'; 
  'LCV101 Fails Open(A)', 'High SG1 level(x)'; 'LCV101 Fails Open(A)', 
'High SG1 Pressure(y)';'LCV101 Fails Open(A)','Turbine Trip(z)'; 
  'LCV101 Fails Closed(B)', 'Low SG1 level(w)'; 'LCV101 Fails 
Closed(B)', 'Low Neutron Power(v)'; 'LCV101 Fails Closed(B)', 'High Avg 
Zone level(u)'; 
  'SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)', 'High SG1 level(x)'; 'SG1 FW FT 
Irrational(C)', 'High SG1 Pressure(y)';'SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)', 'Low 
Neutron Power(v)'}; 
  
[intra, names] = ESCL_Adj_Matrix(intrac, names, 0); 
gObj = biograph(intra,names); 
gObj = view(gObj); 
discrete_nodes = 1:ss; % No. of discrete nodes 
node_sizes = 2*ones(1,ss); % States of nodes, binary in this simple 
case (FALSE = 1, TRUE = 2) 
bnet = ESCL_Mk_Bnet(intra, node_sizes, 'names', names, 'discrete', 
discrete_nodes); 
  
%G = bnet.dag; 
%ESCL_Draw_Bnet(G); 
  
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Impaction of particlea(a)')} = 






bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Pressure Spikes(b)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Pressure Spikes(b)'), 'CPT', [0.9 0.1]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Debris causing actuator failure(c)')} = 
ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, bnet.names('Debris causing actuator 
failure(c)'), 'CPT', [0.88 0.12]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Incorrect Installation(d)')} = 
ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, bnet.names('Incorrect Installation(d)'), 'CPT', 
[0.9 0.1]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Valve Cavitation(e)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Valve Cavitation(e)'), 'CPT', [0.85 0.15]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('High Temperature(f)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('High Temperature(f)'), 'CPT', [0.85 0.15]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Sensor Degradation(g)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Sensor Degradation(g)'), 'CPT', [0.8 0.2]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Lack of calibration(h)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Lack of calibration(h)'), 'CPT', [0.9 0.1]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Bias and Drifting(j)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Bias and Drifting(j)'), 'CPT', [0.8 0.2]); 
  
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('LCV101 Fails Open(A)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('LCV101 Fails Open(A)'), 'CPT', [1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('LCV101 Fails Closed(B)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('LCV101 Fails Closed(B)'), 'CPT', [0.9 0.8 0.7 0.05 0.1 0.2 
0.3 0.1,0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)')} = 
ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, bnet.names('SG1 FW FT Irrational(C)'), 'CPT', 
[0.8 0.6 0.75 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.55 0.05 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.45 
0.95]); 
  
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('High SG1 level(x)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('High SG1 level(x)'), 'CPT', [0.9 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 
0.9]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('High SG1 Pressure(y)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('High SG1 Pressure(y)'), 'CPT', [0.8 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 
0.9]); 
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Turbine Trip(z)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Turbine Trip(z)'), 'CPT', [1.0 0.0 0.9 0.1]);  
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Low SG1 level(w)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Low SG1 level(w)'), 'CPT', [0.8 0.2 0.1 0.9]);  
bnet.CPD{bnet.names('Low Neutron Power(v)')} = ESCL_Tabular_CPD(bnet, 
bnet.names('Low Neutron Power(v)'), 'CPT', [0.7 0.6 0.5 0.25 0.3 0.4 
0.5 0.75]); 
  
engine = ESCL_Jtree_Inf_Engine(bnet); 
evidence = cell(1,ss); 
evidence{bnet.names('High SG1 level(x)')} = 1; 
evidence{bnet.names('High SG1 Pressure(y)')} = 2; 
evidence{bnet.names('Turbine Trip(z)')} = 2; 
evidence{bnet.names('Low SG1 level(w)')} = 2; 
evidence{bnet.names('Low Neutron Power(v)')} = 2; 
[engine, loglik] = ESCL_Enter_Evidence(engine, evidence); 
  
marg = ESCL_Marginal_Nodes(engine, bnet.names('LCV101 Fails Open(A)')); 
marg.T 
  
